Class Notes (837,302)
Canada (510,220)
Philosophy (1,299)
Prof (5)
Lecture

Corporate Social Responsibility

8 Pages
257 Views
Unlock Document

Department
Philosophy
Course
Philosophy 2074F/G
Professor
Prof
Semester
Fall

Description
Student number: (25070)9100 Corporate Social Responsibility Analysis Introduction Corporate social responsibility is a significant temporary topic in society. How we define it and what criteria are going to be used will highly affect the welfare of whole society. Philosophies have come up 3 frameworks, the shareholder model, the stakeholder model, and the market failure model, trying to offer a most satisfactory answer to what is the social responsibility of a corporation. However, Shareholder model fatally neglects the relationship between manager and stakeholders (except shareholders), the power of government intervention, and the moral constraints on how a corporation maximizes its profit. On the other hand, Stakeholder model also has some problems on whether a manager has multiple-fiduciary relationships with all the stakeholders (from a narrow definition), how to balance the conflicting interests between stakeholders, and how to deal with the relationship with rivals in a competitor market. Therefore, shareholder and stakeholder model may cause a serious dead weight lost of a society in real market activities. They fail to reach a pragmatic corporate social responsibility compared to the market failure model. I will argue that the most satisfactory articulation of a corporation’s social responsibility is to maximize its profit and subject to both legal and moral constraints (Heath, P125).This idea is supported by the market failure model. In the rest of this article, I will show how market failure model realizes this responsibility and how shareholder and stakeholder model fail to reach that conclusion. Market Failure Model (By Joseph Heath) Joseph Heath argues that a market failure represents that the market fail to produce the most efficient output (or we say a Pareto-efficient outcome), and to maintain a most rational price level (Heath, P123). A Pareto-efficient outcome is a situation that society cannot make a better move until it makes one group better-off while making other groups much worse-off (Heath, P123). In order to correcting market failure and get closed to a Pareto-efficient situation, government and corporation should both make some effort. Market failure model argues that government should formulate a set of market rules such like discouraging hostile takeover police through regulations. Moreover, providing amenities by building public goods such as railroad is also necessary. Government doing so is to offer a normative market with absence of externalities, symmetric information in transactions, mature insurance institutions, and all factors that make competitions generate an efficient allocation of goods and services. (Heath, P123) However, it is very hard for government to correct market failure sufficiently, as Health argued, because there are great administrative costs of getting the information. This cost is even bigger than the gain of making up the dead weight lost through use litigation. This will make the situation even worse. (Heath, P124) Therefore, corporations need to take some responsibilities to make up the blunt of government intervention by operating under some moral constraints. On corporation aspect, Heath agreed with Friedman that it is no problem for corporation to pursue profit maximization, because it contributes in maintaining a healthy price system. (Heath, P123) However, what matters is that a corporation should seek profit only under the preferred strategies like improving after-sale service, devising more efficient production line, and investing money on new product creation. However, in practical world, a law that prohibits all non-preferred strategy such as bluffing and pollution is impossible to establish. Moreover, non-preferred strategies cause market failure. Therefore, according to Heath, an ethical firm should obey the moral constraints of avoiding non-preferred strategies when seeking profit, even if these non-preferred strategies are legally permissive (Heath, P124). On the other hand, Heath also pays attention to the intrafirm business ethics, which include the obligation of manager towards shareholder and other stakeholders. Heath argues that manager has a fiduciary obligation towards shareholder as their agent (Heath agrees with Friedman’s shareholder model on this issue) (Heath, P123). According to this fiduciary obligation, a manger should seek interest for the shareholders beyond her interest, even though managers do not have a contract forcing them to. On the other hand, the relationship between manager and other stakeholder is moral obligation. As I discussed before, in a Pareto-efficient situation, it is immoral for a manager to make his or her employees or suppliers much worse off in order to benefit the shareholders, because that will cause a market failure. Market failure model is useful in the real market because it adds some specific moral constraints on corporations’ daily conduct of seeking profits. These constraints make up the incompleteness of government intervention and regulation. Under these constraints, corporations can maximize their profit to sustain a sound price system and push the whole market to produce a Pareto-efficient outcome. Shareholder Model (By Milton Friedman) Friedman claims that a manager is the agent for the shareholder. Therefore she has a fiduciary obligation to sense interest for the shareholders’ principle. (Friedman, P65) Heath agrees on this point. However, shareholder model neglects the moral relationship between manager and other stakeholders like clients and employees. For example, according to Friedman, a manger cannot increase the employee’s salary when there is bad inflation in order to maintain the interest for his or her shareholders, because he or she has no right to use the shareholders’ principle. (Friedman, P67) However, in this case, the manager is seeking interest for shareholders while making employees much worse off. As a result, it undermines the Pareto-efficient outcome and creates a market failure. On the other hand, Friedman argues that ideally government and corporations ar
More Less

Related notes for Philosophy 2074F/G

Log In


OR

Join OneClass

Access over 10 million pages of study
documents for 1.3 million courses.

Sign up

Join to view


OR

By registering, I agree to the Terms and Privacy Policies
Already have an account?
Just a few more details

So we can recommend you notes for your school.

Reset Password

Please enter below the email address you registered with and we will send you a link to reset your password.

Add your courses

Get notes from the top students in your class.


Submit