PHILOS 133 Lecture Notes - Lecture 31: Coreference, Possible World, David Hume
Document Summary
Davidson and quine want to get by without intensions, semantic value of a sentence is a truth-value a. i. Most observable thing about language in terms of meaning. The foundation of any theory of meaning (or truth) for a language has to start with ascertaining the truth-value of the sentences. This is because you can do that largely by reference to behavior: henry believes that topeka is in kansas. Lincoln is in nebraska | same truth value. a: maybe make topeka is in kansas a fact or state of affairs. b. i. b. ii. b. iii. A state of affairs is a lot like a singular proposition. Lincoln is in nebraska and topeka is in kansas give you different states of affairs (without any recourse to semantic non-innocence) States of affairs differ from propositions: propositions are abstract objects that help us keep track of truth-conditions. A situation determines some states of affairs are factual.
