BIOL-4700 Lecture Notes - Lecture 8: Eusociality, Evolutionarily Stable Strategy, Reciprocal Altruism
14 Mar 2017
School
Department
Course
Professor
Document Summary
Where individuals adjust their actions to the presence or activities of others so as to maximize their own immediate direct fitness: cooperative behaviors. Where individuals perform activities that are adapted to increasing the fitness of others because this ultimately contributes to their own direct or indirect fitness: prisoner"s dilemma model- a 2 player strategy from game theory. 2 options each encounter: cooperate (c) with partner, defect (d) against partner. Fitness depends upon strategy of both: evolutionary stable strategy (ess) A genetically distinctive set of rules for behavior that, when adopted by a certain proportion of the population cannot be replaced by an alternative strategy. W= probability of future interaction: strategies. Tit-for-tat (tft)= c on 1st turn and reciprocate opponent"s strategy thereafter. Axelrod and hamilton (1981) asked behavioral ecologists to send their best strategies for a pairwise tournament of iterated prisoner"s. Must remember previous opponent"s move: pavlov (pav)= c on 1st turn, retain same strategy if previous pay-off was.
