PHIL 212 Lecture Notes - Lecture 1: Mental Substance, Pineal Gland, Physicalism
4 May 2018
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Philosophy of Mind 8.29.17 Lecture Notes – Cartesian Dualism
- Mind/Body problem – how does the mind relate to the body?
- Is the mind reducible to the brain?
- Problem of Mental Representation: How can my thoughts represent (be about) objects
in the external world?
- Problem of Free Will: Can we freely choose our own actions or are actions wholly
determined by antecedent causes?
- Physicalism/Materialism: the view that the mind is part of the physical world
- Dualism: the view that the mind is not part of the physical world – it is something extra
that extends beyond the realm of physics
- Mental state: any sort of mental happening
o Ex: beliefs, desires, pains, itches, the experience of seeing red, etc.
Cartesian Dualism
- Two kinds of substances – physical substances and mental substances
o The body is a physical substance
o The mind is a mental substance (something like a soul)
o They can still causally interact with one another
- Minds exist out of the physical universe – do’t ee take up spae
- Descartes imagines a sort of separate mental, non-material realm existing alongside the
physical universe
- Mental/physical interaction
o Can causally interact with one another
o Immaterial thoughts can cause physical body to do things
- Descartes hypothesized that the pineal gland was the interface between the mind and
the brain
- Descartes provides several arguments for dualism – Leiiz’s La
o If m and b are identical, then they must have all the same properties.
o Identity requires exact sameness
- Properties – features of objects
- Argument #1: Argument from Divisibility
o 1. My id is’t diisile.
▪ Descartes believed that my experiences cannot be cut up, for instance.
▪ Counterexamples can be experiments with split-brain patients
o 2. My brain is divisible.
o 3. Leiiz’s La
o 4. Therefore, my mind is distinct from my brain.
o The argument begs the question – the 1st premise assumes the mind is
immaterial
- Argument #2: Argument from Indubitability
o 1. I a’t dout that I hae a id.
▪ I think, therefore I am.
▪ Doubting is a mental act
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Document Summary
Philosophy of mind 8. 29. 17 lecture notes cartesian dualism. Problem of mental representation: how can my thoughts represent (be about) objects. Physicalism/materialism: the view that the mind is part of the physical world. Dualism: the view that the mind is not part of the physical world it is something extra that extends beyond the realm of physics. Mental state: any sort of mental happening: ex: beliefs, desires, pains, itches, the experience of seeing red, etc. Two kinds of substances physical substances and mental substances: the body is a physical substance, the mind is a mental substance (something like a soul, they can still causally interact with one another. Minds exist out of the physical universe do(cid:374)"t e(cid:448)e(cid:374) take up spa(cid:272)e. Descartes imagines a sort of separate mental, non-material realm existing alongside the physical universe. Mental/physical interaction: can causally interact with one another. Immaterial thoughts can cause physical body to do things.
