PHIL 111 Lecture Notes - Lecture 2: Noumenon, Apperception, Syllogism
The Political Philosophy of Kant Session 3 April 11, 1967
57
LS: Or the phenomena. That is part of the German, the word Erscheinung, which he
sometimes translates by “phenomenon”
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and sometimes by “appearances.” What shall
we do? We have to make up our minds, ya?
Mr. Reinken: Kant doesn’t use “phenomena” as well as Erscheinung, or does Kant seem
to . . .
LS: “Phenomenon” is only the Latin, or Greek term for Erscheinung, ya.
Mr. Reinken: —for Erscheinung, yeah.
LS: All right, but if you understand that this is—yes.
xxxiii
Mr. Reinken:
these phenomena must none the less be capable of complete causal explanation in
terms of other phenomena—
xxxiv87
LS: Ya, of complete explanation. So in other words, this hold-up man [LS points to the
board] is in principle completely intelligible by the empirical sciences, ya? Good. Yes?
Mr. Reinken:
We have to take their strictly empirical character as the supreme ground of
explanation, leaving entirely out of account their noumenal
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character (that is,
the transcendental cause of their empirical character) as being completely
unknown, save in so far as the empirical serves for its sensible sign.
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LS: So in other words, when I see this, when I observe this hold-up man . . . a vicious
liar, then I explain it by this causally, as we have seen. But I can also regard it—this nasty
fellow, nasty character, as the sensual side of the choice which he has made, namely, of
the wicked choice, or a particular kind of wicked choice. Yes?
Mr. Reinken:
Let us apply this to experience. Man is one of the phenomena of the
sensible world, and in so far one of the natural causes the causality of
which must stand under empirical laws. Like all other things in nature, he
must have an empirical character. This character we come to know
through he powers and faculties which he reveals in his actions. In lifeless,
or merely animal, nature we find no ground for thinking that any faculty is
conditioned otherwise than in a merely sensible manner. Man, however,
who knows all the rest of nature solely through the senses, knows himself
also through mere apperception; and this, indeed, in acts and inner
determinations which he cannot regard as impressions of the senses. He is
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Strauss speaks over the reader, whose words are inaudible as a result.
xxxiv
Ibid.
xxxv
In original: “intelligible”
xxxvi
Ibid.
The Political Philosophy of Kant Session 3 April 11, 1967
58
thus to himself, on the one hand phenomenon, and on the other hand, in
respect of certain faculties the action of which cannot be ascribed to the
receptivity of sensibility, a merely noumenal object. We entitle these
faculties understanding and reason. The latter, in particular, we distinguish
in a quite peculiar and especial way from all empirically conditioned
powers. For it views its objects merely
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in the light of ideas, and in
accordance with them determines the understanding, which then proceeds
to make an empirical use of its own similarly pure concepts.
xxxviii
LS: Now this seems to complicate matters a bit. We observe all kinds of things in the
phenomenal world without getting into any troubles except when we come to man. Man
does not simply belong to the phenomenal world
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because he has understanding and
reason. Understanding and reason cannot be explained psychologically, physiologically.
Simply stated, understanding and reason are the ground of the phenomenal world and
can, therefore, [not be]
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explained in terms of the phenomenal world. Does this make
sense? You can take—well, take another example: try to have a psychology of thinking in
which you try to understand acts of thinking mechanically; mechanically, say, on the
basis of stimulus and response or such other things.
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But assuming that a man makes a
perfectly sound syllogism, can this be understood in terms of, say, stimulus-response?
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I
mean, if he makes a blunder, makes a mistake, then you can say: Well, he was asleep, or
was drunk, or he thought of something else, etc. So errors are in need of an explanation,
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let us say of a scientific explanation. But correct thinking is not as such in need of
psychological explanation, and this is also something which is implied in what Kant says
here.
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[Man] does not simply belong to the phenomenal world by the mere fact that he
has understanding or reason. Yes?
Mr. Bruell:
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Does that mean that understanding and thinking
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can themselves be
understood without recourse, or without reflection upon the phenomenal world of—?
LS: Ya, cannot. I mean, this was a great controversy, around the last decades of the
nineteenth century [and the] first decade of this century, between two schools. I know
that the discussion, especially from Germany (I believe that Germany was the main seed,
but it surely was affected also the other countries), and there was a way of thinking called
psychologism. And psychologism was the attempt to give an account of logic and logical
thinking in psychological terms. And psychology was at that time still associationist,
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and so on. The most famous document is the first volume of Husserl’s Logical
Investigations.
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I do not even know whether they are translated into English; I suppose
they are, but I do not know how well. Be this as it may. For Kant, this question is not
immediately relevant but, as this passage shows, the understanding and the reason are
not, cannot be understood in terms of the phenomenal world; and we can give this
account, which I believe comes closest to what Kant himself meant to
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[say], because
xxxvii
In original: “merely exclusively”
xxxviii
Ibid., B574-575.
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See for example, Howard Warren, A History of the Association Psychology (Baltimore, MD:
Johns Hopkins University, 1921).
Document Summary
Mr. reinken: kant doesn"t use phenomena as well as erscheinung, or does kant seem to . Ls: phenomenon is only the latin, or greek term for erscheinung, ya. Ls: all right, but if you understand that this is yes. xxxiii. Mr. reinken: these phenomena must none the less be capable of complete causal explanation in terms of other phenomena xxxiv87. Ls: so in other words, when i see this, when i observe this hold-up man . a vicious liar, then i explain it by this causally, as we have seen. But i can also regard it this nasty fellow, nasty character, as the sensual side of the choice which he has made, namely, of the wicked choice, or a particular kind of wicked choice. Man is one of the phenomena of the sensible world, and in so far one of the natural causes the causality of which must stand under empirical laws.
