CPO-3703 Lecture Notes - Lecture 3: Representative Democracy, Electoral District, European Parliament
21 Mar 2018
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A more realistic example: divide 900 amongst three groups. Examples: (on canvas) indecisive function: for a = (x, y),x and y always tie, regardless of the preferences of individuals in g. Imposed function: for a= (x,y), x (or y) always wins, regardless of the preferences of individuals of g: simple majority function, absolute majority function, qualified majority function. If you were to relax one of these conditions which would you choose: universal domain (d, unanimity / pareto optimality (p, non-dictatorship (d) How you count votes is consequential for the outcome you get: multiple majorities and instability, objective rules can lead to different outcomes. The (cid:862)(cid:373)ajorit(cid:455)(cid:863) (cid:449)e see is (cid:373)u(cid:272)h (cid:373)ore tha(cid:374) a si(cid:373)ple represe(cid:374)tatio(cid:374) of i(cid:374)di(cid:448)iduals" preferences. 50. 00001: qualified (super-) majority: a majority that requires multiple majorities. Example would be the european parliament: unanimity rule: have to have the support of everyone.
