PHI 107 Lecture Notes - Lecture 6: Compatibilism
14 Sep 2016
School
Department
Course
Professor
Document Summary
Problem #1: can the compatibilist really claim to be able to capture our intuitions about acting freely: the super-neuroscientist. Objection: the subject would not be able to do anything other than what the super-neuroscientist predicted; the situation is not a case of genuine free will. Objection: once the subject is told what they are determined to do, the fact that they are told this changes things. Reply: we can build into the case that the s-n knows that the subject is going to be told the answer. Problem #2: can the compatibilist really claim to be able to makes sense of moral responsibility: the murder pill. Objection: the person did act out of their beliefs and desires, but they only had these beliefs and desires because of the pill. Note: this objection doesn"t save the version of compatibilism that we have been working with; but one might treat this as a motivation to revise the definition of compatibilism.
