Economics 1010a1 Lecture Notes - Lecture 1: Double Auction, Reservation Wage, Work Motivation

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16 Dec 2021
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8 sp iii reciprocity (fehr & gaechter) Invest in project = 0. 4 return for everyone. If all invest 1. 6 x investment for everyone. Punish for x at the price of 1/3x of. Contribute nothing, because it is costly (0. 6x), only get 1. 6 if everyone else also invests don"t invest. Employer specifies contract with wage w and desired effort level . If employee accepts, he chooses effort level e (1- Employee payoff = w c(e) which is the cost of putting in a level of e. Use 1 token to punish/reward employee for shirking/performing by 2. 5 tokens. Effort level e = 1 (lowest) is offered of. Two groups: control group (same contract game as before but without rewards/punishments, explicit incentives in the form of a fine. 0. 33 chance of being able to find out whether someone shirked. Maximum punishment would lead to effort level of e = 4 (because of expecting punishment) Both effort level and wage are fixed.

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