Consider the following game:
A
B
A
12,18
5,9
B
6,8
20,15
List all of the Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria of this game.
There is also a mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium to this game. In that equilibrium, with what probabilities will each player play action A? Action B?
Consider the following game:
A | B | |
A | 12,18 | 5,9 |
B | 6,8 | 20,15 |
List all of the Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria of this game.
There is also a mixed strategy Nash Equilibrium to this game. In that equilibrium, with what probabilities will each player play action A? Action B?
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Related questions
Consider the following game of chicken. Two firms are considering entering the market for fidget spinners. The payoffs from each possible action (enter or not enter) are presented in the payoff matrix below. The first payoff in each cell is for Twisters:
Acme Inc |
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Don't enter |
Enter |
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Twisters |
Don't enter |
( 0, 0 ) |
( 0, 1 ) |
Enter |
( 1, 0 ) |
( -2, -2 ) |
If both Acme and Twisters make their choice simultaneously, which of the following is true?
a. This game has no Nash equilibrium. |
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b. This game has a single Nash equilibrium. |
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c. This game has more than one Nash equilibrium. |
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d. Neither Acme Inc nor Twisters has a strictly dominant strategy. |
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e. both c and d are correct. |
QUESTION 1
Stackelberg duopoly game is also known as the ________ model. If we change the Stackelberg ______ competition game to a simultaneous-move game, we get the ______ game results.
A. | leader-follower, quantity; Cournot | |
B. | Competitive fringe; price; backward induction | |
C. | leader-follower, quantity; Bertrand | |
D. | entry, price; Cournot |
QUESTION 2
Comparing Stackelberg and Cournot competition results, we can say that the _____ is better off while the ______ is worse off under Stackelberg than under Cournot results. This result show that there is _______________ advantage.
A. | entrant, incumbent, investment | |
B. | leader, follower, first-mover | |
C. | follower, leader, a size | |
D. | incumbent, entrant, first-mover |
QUESTION 3
Mark all the FALSE statements
A. | An equilibrium is a collection of strategies (and a strategy is a complete plan of action), whereas an outcome describes what will happen only in the contingencies that are expected to arise, not in every contingency that might arise. | |
B. | In games of complete but imperfect information, backward induction is still the strongest process to solve the model to get unique equilibrium. | |
C. | All subgame perfect Nash equilibria (SPNE) are Nash equilibria (NE), but not all Nash equilibria is SPNE | |
D. | We cannot apply the notion of Nash equilibrium to dynamic games of complete information if we allowed a player s strategy to leave unspecified actions in some contingencies. | |
E. | A game can be of perfect information whenever Nature or Luck does not play, each information set does not necessarily need to have a single node. |
QUESTION 4
True or false. Mark the correct sequence:
I. Simultaneity of moves means that these games have imperfect information.
II. Dynamic games of complete and perfect information do not necessarily need that a player observes all the previous moves, just part of them are fine.
III. Backward induction and subgame perfect equilibrium concept lead to the same result in games of incomplete information.
IV. Any game in extensive form is a subgame itself.
A. | TFFT | |
B. | TTTF | |
C. | FTFF | |
D. | TTFT |
QUESTION 5
The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is the equilibrium associated with ____________ outcome. Subgame perfect equilibrium ________ non-credible threats.
A. | Maxmin; involves | |
B. | the backward induction; does not involve | |
C. | Iterative deletion of weakly dominated strategies; rules out | |
D. | the backward induction; includes |