POL208Y1 Lecture Notes - Lecture 6: Carl Von Clausewitz, Neoliberalism, Nuclear Proliferation
13 Dec 2012
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Conflicting and competing preferences (sometimes zero games) Tension between community choice and individual choice. Look at 2 countries - nuclear: best community choice- no nuclear proliferation. Individually- country goes nuclear and the other country doesn"t. Rank in numbers - dc (5)> cc(2)>dd(0)>cd(-2) Cooperate- best outcome for both countries: ex. Best response for india will be to defect if they know for sure pakistan wouldn"t: ex. If pakistan is defecting then india should defect also: therefor e likely outcome is defect for both countries - stable outcome and a dominate strategy. Nash equilibrium: a pair of strategies (an outcome) for which neither players gains by changing her own strategy. Stable equilibrium,: actors will not change their policy unless they can agree to do so mutually and simultaneously. The problem of finite games (backwards induction) What institutional design can facilities tit for tat (neo-liberalism)
