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PHL 333 Study Guide - Comprehensive Midterm Guide: Thrasymachus, Square Enix Europe, SpeedstepPremium

12 pages619 viewsWinter 2017

Department
Philosophy
Course Code
PHL 333
Professor
Sasa Stankovic
Study Guide
Midterm

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Ryerson
PHL 333
MIDTERM EXAM
STUDY GUIDE
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Plato’s Repuli (Part 1) Jan 16, 2017
Introduction to Plato & His Ideas
Born into an influential family
Influenced heavily by Socrates, who:
o Philosophically questioned people about what they were experts on, ie, asking a lawyer
what law or justice is
o Challenged the youth to question authority (and was later charged and executed for
iitig a upisig
o “tood up fo the seah fo tuth/piiple at the ost of his life
Theme of something appearing to be, vs. it actually being
o Ie, social media allowing people to appear happy and rich and successful, when the
reality is student debt and depression and joblessness
o Questioig hat Beig is, if thigs ae ostatl hagig ad thee udefiale
“oethig a ol e defied as it is if it is unchanging; if it is changing, it
ust e defied as it is eoig
o Acknowledgement of two realities: the physical and metaphysical; senses v. ideas
What is Virtue & can it be taught? Disussed i Plato’s dialogue etee “oates ad Meo
o Plato begins the dialogue ith Meo askig “oates ith a itue e
auied/taught? poptig “oates to the ask, hat is itue?
o We a’t ask the fist uestio ithout fist defiig itue, ut a’t tul defie itue
because the concept is constantly changing
o Meo gies eaples of itue fo e, it is leadig a solid politial life; fo oe, it’s
tending to the household), but Socrates challenges this ou a’t defie soethig 
examples
o Eaples do’t defie the ualit, the shae the ualit; in providing an example
instead of a definition, the knowledge of what exactly the quality is is lost
Eidos: the fo of the thig that allos us to eogize it, ie, e eogize a hai/a/lothig
because of the common form that we connect with our preconceived idea of such objects
One can be led to believe a certain definition or goodness/badness of a thing based on the
perceived purposes of that thing (is, justice restricts our freedom and happiness)
Plato’s Repuli
Begins with Plato arguing with Thrasymachus about the goodness of justice, but Thrasymachus
gives up the argument pretty quick
Glauo, usatisfied ith Plato’s ase, igs the aguet ak up i the hopes of a oe
convincing one
Plato and Glaucon categorize justice into the fiest of the thee kids of good
o Good i itself: those thigs hih ig tepoa happiess ut do’t podue
anything that benefits further than itself (ie, drinking/partying, watching some movies,
eating candy)
o Good in itself and because of its fruit: it is enjoyable in itself, but also produces longer
lasting benefits (ie, reading/knowledge, shopping, listening to music); this is the
category Socrates places justice in
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o Good because of its fruit: those things which are difficult or upsetting to do, but yield
something that makes it worth it (ie, housework, studying); this is the category most
people place justice in
Glaucon challenges Socrates to show him how exactly justice is good in itself, not for the
benefits it later yields; he also challenges Socrates in how justice is good apart from its
appearance, arguing that all the good a person gets from being just is simply because of the
reputation of justness
o the geatest good fo a peso ould e to e ujust hile appeaig just
Glauo’s aguet begins:
o The Origin of Justice
People who have both inflicted and suffered injustice, but are too weak to inflict
injustice or protect themselves from it these people come to a compromise
Laws are created to prevent people from hurting one another, which (Glaucon
argues) means that everyone would hurt everyone if they could bypass the law
Also implies that law = justice, but is that really the case? Is there justice and
ijustie hee las do’t eist? Ho a e defie justie if it hages fo
place to place and time to time? How can something we build our whole lives,
countries, and systems on be so fluid and changing?
o Is Justice Good?
People act justly unwillingly
Story of Gyges of Lydia: found a ring that allowed him to become
invisible, subsequently seduced the Queen, murdered the King, and
took over the kingdom
o Those who live unjustly live better (as long as they remain uncaught/untried)
Glaucon begins a thought experiment to determine whether injustice or justice
is truly better in and of itself
The perfectly unjust person is completely unjust, but appears to be
completely just; if they are caught, they have the power, prestige, or
influence to defend themselves against all charges and still appear just;
this is to see the good i itself of injustice
The perfectly just person is completely just, but appears to be
opletel ujust; the ae aught ad tied ad totued ad
eeuted; this is to see the good i itself of justie
Glaucon concludes (for the sake of argument) that a person has no
reason to be just as it yields nothing for them, whereas a person has
every reason to be unjust (as long as they remain uncaught), because it
yields everything
Adeiatus’ agues futhe:
o Poets, politicians, teachers, and parents all praise justice, but only for the rewards of a
reputation (ie, good marriages, friends, repute)
o But justie aloe is’t eough fo a lot of people get , ad so e hae ujust people
appearing just
o Justice in itself appears to do no good for a person
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