HIS343 Espionage Study Guide.docx

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Department
History
Course Code
HIS343Y1
Professor
Brandon King

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HIS343 Study Guide Intelligence in World War I Prelude – UK Intelligence 1909-1914  Realisation of growing naval opposition from Germany and its own inferiority in terms of land army fuelled British to move toward setting up a professional intelligence service  Secret Service Bureau – MI5 and MI6 – created in 1909 o Task of these agencies was to find out the secrets of German naval plans and agents o Were created without sense of future planning -> had very little actual power  MI5 (Home Section) o Responsible for domestic intelligence – meant neutralizing foreign agents in Britain o Run by Vernon Kell o At the outbreak of WWI, 21 German spies were arrested in Britain – constituted most of the German spy ring  MI6 (Foreign Section) o Responsible for stealing German naval plans – however had very little capabilities to carry this out o Had to create spy network in Germany from scratch o MI6 was less successful at gathering secrets than MI5 was at counter-intelligence o Responsible to the Admiralty o Efforts were almost exclusively directed against Germany o Very few resources for full-time agents o MI6 successes:  Provided technical aspects of the German Navy o Their focus on the German navy reflects Britain’s own priorities in the naval arms race – distracted them from the German army’s plans Intelligence at the Outbreak of the War  By 1914, intelligence was still a relatively new practice  On the eve of the war, the Great Powers employed underfunded agencies  Intelligence had very little to offer, had little role in policymaking in the European states o Intelligence was fairly irrelevant o Played little role in war plans  Disconnect exist between espionage practices and new technologies – relied almost solely on human agents  When war breaks out in August 1914, all the powers assumed it would be a short war – “short war illusion” o War would be over by Christmas, ended by a quick offensive o No European states mobilized the intelligence agencies since they believed they wouldn’t need them  However by the end of 1914, the war of attrition and stalemate sets in 1  European powers were looking for their enemies vulnerabilities – saw that intelligence might be able to provide these answers  Intelligence is quickly mobilized – attempts characterized by desperation  Intelligence’s early methods: o Use of spy balloons – to see across the front lines o Use of carrier pigeons – transfer between HQs at the front line and behind the lines o However, these were still not reliable Human Intelligence (HUMINT) in World War I  Military planners want to feed human intelligence into their plans  German HUMINT o Not many success stories o Mata Hari – well-known exotic dancer  Executed in 1917 by the French on the charges that she was a German spy  Left the public perception that France was swamped with spies – this was untrue o Germany receives very little information from their spies in Europe o However, spies operating in the United States as saboteurs were much more successful  Sabotaged armament shipments to the Allies - it was vital to cut the links between the US and the Allies  Germans were aided by the weak counter-intelligence system in the US  1915 – German human agents blow up arms and power plans in Pittsburgh and Washington  July 1916 – blow up a munitions plan in Black Tom Pier, New Jersey – was the most important plan for selling and sending arms  Allied HUMINT o Britain had a very frustrating experience with human intelligence  Issue of how to rung agents across the front lines – very restricted due to stalemate o Attempt was made to turn civilian populations into a spy network o “La Dame Blanche”  Run jointly by the British and the French  Allies turned to the civilian population occupied by the German army  Operation was focused in Southern Belgium – task was to spy railway networks  Used women and young girls to report back intelligence  However, issues over how to communicate across enemy lines -> use of the radio networks  At its peak LDB consisted of 50 railway watching posts  Was able to map an entire network of railways in North-western Europe used by the German army  British knew exactly where all the German divisions were located 2  Moreover, only 45 out of 1200 who participated in LDB were ever arrested  Helped revolutionize human intelligence – new application of human intelligence system – i.e. the use of civilians as spies  However, still faced problems and roadblocks  Took 3 years into the war for LDB to become effective  Information said very little about enemy intentions  LDB was outpaced by other technological intelligence methods Image Intelligence (IMINT) in World War I  IMINT became an important feature of intelligence during the war because of the reality of trench warfare and being able to see across enemy lines  Closely connected to the invention of the airplane – use of aerial reconnaissance  Introduction of the camera into the airplane – gave opposing sides the ability to map out the front lines of their enemies o No longer need to rely on human intelligence from the pilots  British were key to innovations: o 1915 - cameras begin to be mounted on the bottom of airplanes o Cameras allow for calculating distances for artilleries and distances between trenches o Allowed the British to see how the German army divisions were being moved  Spy planes were also used to fly over enemy cities to measure their industrial capabilities  None of the major battles took places without some form of aerial espionage o More than 80% of the Royal Air Force were reconnaissance planes  Limitations: o Problems with the weather – rain, fog etc. could lead to unclear images o Quality of the photos was far from perfect o There was still some form of human errors on the part of photo analyzers o Spy planes were not designed for quick manoeuvres and were vulnerable to enemy planes  Success in the Battle of the Marne – Sept. 1914 o German army had swept through Belgium, were moving towards Paris o French and British had aerial reconnaissance activities -> helps them locate German forces o Allied aerial reconnaissance gave them accurate intelligence – allowed them to shift their forces to the Marne o Role of IMINT  Provided the potential for Allied victory by revealing the intended manoeuvres of the German army  Created a situation in which Allied commanders could operate from a very advantageous position 3 Signals Intelligence (SIGNINT) in World War I  Much of the development of SIGINT was due to the emergence of wireless communication through the radio o Radio allows for direct communication between any two points without the need for a wire between locations o Radio could enable a naval commander to coordinate a fleet wherever the ships might be o Radio would allow generals to direct their campaigns, keeping them in continual contact with battalions, regardless of their movements  Undersea telegraph cables had been used up until then o 1914 – British had severed the German undersea transatlantic cables  Forced the Germans to send their messages via insecure radio links or via cable owned by other countries - later becomes important in the Zimmerman Telegram  European powers became much more reliant on the radio to transmit information – and also to protect these messages through encryption o Radio’s greatest military weakness was that messages will inevitably reach the enemy as well as the intended recipient o Reliable encryption became a necessity – cryptographers had to find a way of preventing the enemy from deciphering these messages o Led to delivering messages in code  European powers begin to set up code-breaking agencies o Needed linguists, mathematicians, people with knowledge of military strategy o Needed wireless stations to intercept these messages  Britain - Room 40 o Secret intelligence system of British Naval Intelligence o Led by Alfred Ewing o Objective was to intercept and decrypt German naval and diplomatic codes o By 1019, British were the pioneering state in signals intelligence o Aided by poor German security o Was able to crack German codes through a variety of means  Worked in cooperation with the French  August 1914 – British capture a German naval codebook  Oct. 1914 – Australian Navy captures another German codebook  Germans still use these codes up until 1916  Germany – Abhorchdienst o Germans entered the war with no military cryptanalytic bureau o Not until 1916 did they set up the Abhorchdienst, an organization devoted to intercepting Allied messages 4 o With a lack of French radio communication (because they still had access to their landlines), Germans could not make any interceptions and did not bother to develop their cryptanalytic department  Battle of Tannenberg – August 1914 o Involved both German and Russian signals intelligence o Russians hope to trap and destroy German forces o Russian communications and SIGINT were done very poorly  Russians made a lot of mistakes transmitting message between divisions  Poor job distributing their cipher keys - some units of the Russian army were not able to understand messages from others  Russian message had to be repeated, and left un-encyrpted o Germans were intercepting all of the Russian messages o August 1914 – Germans intercept a message which revealed the Russian army’s locations  Revealed that one division was not moving  Unprecedented in intelligence because it gave clear insight into enemy intentions o Germans decide to surprise one of the Russian divisions o Intelligence convinced the German high command to engage one of the Russian divisions at Tannenberg  30, 000 Russians killed into battle -> forces the Russians to withdraw  Russian defeat lays the groundwork for the discontent with the war domestically in Russia o Tanneberg showed the dangers of not using safe ways of transmitting messages  Battle of Jutland – May 31, 1916 o Biggest naval battle in WWI – involved 240 warships – took place between British and German warships o Goal of the Germans was numerical superiority in the North Sea - intention was to lure out, trap, and destroy a portion of British fleet o British were able to intercept and decipher Germans plans for the battle  Patrick Beesly: Room was 40 was able to “forecast the sortie of the Hochseeflotte more than a week before it occurred”  Warned the British naval command of the exact coordinates of the German navy o Signals intelligence was still largely untested and viewed with scepticism – seemed to contradict the instincts of naval commanders o Room 40 also made mistakes on the eve of the battle  It had concluded that the German fleet was still at port – this was untrue  Shook confidence in Room 40  Nonetheless, British Navy was able to avoid the trap set by the Germans o After the battle, intercepted messages showed that the German Navy was disengaging and retreating to home port 5  British intelligence knew the routes and when it was happening  Offered a great opportunity for the British Navy  British Command thought the information was not accurate -> sent the Navy in the wrong direction o Room 40 was able to maintain British naval presence in the North Sea – however a huge opportunity had been missed  The Zimmermann Telegram – January 1917 o After Jutland, Germans decide to switch emphasis onto submarine warfare  Tried to cut off supplies from the Allies  Problem was that the US was still a neutral power – Wilson still believed he could act as mediator o In 1917, Germans grow increasingly desperate -> adopt a policy of unrestricted submarine warfare  Wanted to cut the lifeline between the US and Britain  Expected that the Americans would probably enter the war however believed it work the Americans too long to mobilize o Creation of the “Mexican Option”  Proposed an alliance with Mexico – Zimmerman wanted Mexico to invade American territories to act as a distraction  Also wanted Mexico to persuade Japan to attack US East Coast  Wanted the Americans to have domestic problems so that they could not afford to send troops to Europe o Telegram is sent to Mexico on Jan. 16  Announced the adoption of unrestricted submarine warfare  Sent via Sweden and the more direct American-owned cable – both routes touched England  British intercepted the message o Problems for the British  Wanted to get the Americans into the war as Allies but didn’t want to try to manipulate American politics  Didn’t want to expose that the British were monitoring traffic on American owned cables  Didn’t want to expose to the Germans that Room 40 had deciphered their codes o Telegram is kept secret since there was a chance that unrestricted submarine warfare would incite America to enter the war anyway in February  However Wilson continued his desire to act as a mediator despite the German policy o Blinker Hall, Director of Naval Intelligence, decides to exploit the telegram by acquiring the text of the Zimmerman Telegram that was sent from Washington to Mexico  Germans would assume it been stolen from the Mexicans, not cracked by the British on its way to America 6 o American ambassador was shown the full text – telegram is also “re-decoded” in the American embassy so that Wilson could claim that it had been obtained and deciphered by Americans, on American soil o Wilson’s inhibitions swept away by the telegram o April 1917 – Americans declare war on Germany  Wilson cited Zimmermann Telegram as one of the key reasons  Created a national sense of outrage o Timing of the Zimmermann Telegram was important – there had been no immediate prospect of the Americans entering the war o Telegram shows the maturation of signals intelligence  Were effectively able to hide the source of the telegram  Germans assumed that the “treachery was committed in Mexico” o Legacy of the Telegram  Telegram altered the course of history  Killed the American illusion that we could go about our business happily separate from other nations Consequences  Following World War I, cryptology won widespread recognition of its importance, and so gained governmental support and a permanent organizational existence.  At last, the major powers, realizing that intelligence could contribute critically to military victory, took it seriously.  World War I was decisively effected by intelligence, offered to break the deadlock  Throughout the war, intelligence had made great gains – had undergone a ‘revolution’ SECONDARY READINGS :  Simon Singh, The Code Book, chapter 3, ―The Mechanization of Secrecy,‖ pp. 101-115. [Course Reader] 7 The Golden Age of Covert Operations  The Golden Age in the 1950s and 1960s greatly affected public perception of what intelligence agencies should do  The success of operations in Iran and Guatemala seemed to prove to American policymakers how easy it was to overthrow governments – made the CIA’s reputation. o Set a pattern for covert operations in the following years. o Believed that all other covert operations could work as easily in other countries Covert Operations before 1949  In 1918, covert operations were used to attempt to overthrow the Bolsheviks – “Lockhart Plot” o By May 1918, Robert Lockhart, a US Diplomat in Russia, was in contact with anti- Bolshevist groups o Sidney Reilly, a MI6 agent, is sent to Russia o His plan is to turn the Bolshevik army against them  Makes promises to certain elements of the army  Latvian part of the army is promised independence  Dipose the Bolshevik gov’t  Was to arrest Lenin and Trotzky, remove their pants and parade them through Moscow  Thereafter a caretaker government would be installed o CHEKA agents infiltrate the Plot, come in contact with Reilly and Lockhart - uncover the plot to conduct sabotage o August 1918 – Cheka arrests Lockhart  Reilly escapes o Cheka publicly announces it had disrupted the Lockhart Plot o Lockhart Plot was a total disaster for the West  After the failure, British and French abandon the idea of covertly overthrowing the Bolsheviks  In WWII, covert operations were embraced by the Allies o OSS had covert operation branch – provided arms and money to European resistance groups o However, covert operations were subsidiary element to war planning in Europe – always a last ditch attempt, never the first option  With the beginning of the Cold War, covert operations were given a new lease on life – American policymakers saw their potential to affect change  1948: CIA intervention in the Italian elections – supported the democratic parties, prevent the Communists from winning  CIA covert operations behind the Iron Curtain failed because Soviet intelligence was able to easily interrupt the plots 8 Covert Operations in the Nuclear Age  In 1949, Soviets successfully test their first nuclear weapon  The Soviets now have nuclear capabilities – the idea of waging nuclear warfare was dangerous to the US  Covert operations were seen as the better alternative than engaging in nuclear warfare o Offered plausible deniability  Covert action should be undertaken so as to enable Washington to argue plausibly that the US was not involved; and if the US role became impossible to hide, at least the president should be spared direct implication o Offered to break the stalemate in the international system Dwight Eisenhower and Covert Operations  Under Eisenhower, covert operations become an instrument of first choice to carry out foreign policy o CIA was almost always acting on presidential authority  1953 – John Foster Dulles was Secretary of State, his brother Allen Dulles was head of the CIA o Dulles brothers have a good working relationship with Eisenhower o CIA operations are approved at the highest level  Eisenhower wanted to reverse the gains communism made – in the spirit of the containment o Containment  Only way to deal with Soviets is through confrontation and containment globally  The US alone was capable of imposing limits on Soviet expansion  US must do so discreetly and indirectly by promoting the prosperity, stability and security of those countries in danger o Truman Doctrine - 1947  Was an unconditional pledge of American assistance to countries anywhere in the world that were threatened either by external aggression from the USSR or an indigenous Communist insurgency backed by Moscow o NSC-68 – 1950  Containment policy was no longer sufficient – communism had to be destroyed  Conducting offensive operations to destroy vital elements of the Soviet war- making capacity, and to keep the enemy off balance until the full offensive strength of the United States and its allies can be brought to bear  Covert operations would be used globally – became the primary instrument of intervention for Eisenhower to change regimes that unfavourable to the US  Middle East and Asia seemed to be suitable terrain for covert operations because those states were emerging nations; had fragile political systems  Covert operations fit in Eisenhower’s “New Look” policy – to promote American foreign policy on a cheaper basis, reducing increasing expenditures o Became much more reliant on nuclear weapons as a deterrent ; “massive retaliation” 9 Iran 1953 – Operation AJAX Prelude  Americans were concerned that Iran offered a potential place for the expansion of communism due to its proximity to the Soviet Union o Also held private concerns about oil  Before the Cold War, Iran had been dominated by the British o Had placed Reza Shah Pahlavi as the head of Iran until 1941 o Replaced by his son Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, who rued until 1979  Iranian oil industry was dominated by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC), now known as BP  AIOC was a target of nationalist anger, seen as a symbol of British imperials -> calls for nationalization grow stronger o Belief that profits from AIOC should be shared with the Iranian people  March 1951 – Iranian parliament passes a resolution to nationalize the AIOC  Mohammad Mossadeq becomes PM of Iran – dedicated to carrying out nationalization  At first, Truman tries to media between the company and the Iranian gov’t  However, Mossadeq position seemed to decline – seen more by the Americans as a Communist or at least in league with them o US concerned because Iran was a potential gateway for the Soviets to access to Persian Gulf  July 1951 – AIOC closes down its main refinery in Iran, refused to budge in negotiations, instigate an embargo against Iranian oil  Mossadeq had been pleading with the US for aide – Americans refused -> Iran is teetering on the brink of collapse o In 1953, Mossadeq requested aide from Eisenhower personally through a letter o Behind the request was an implicit threat that the alternative was communism, a threat made vivid by the Tudeh’s “Yankee-Go-Home” campaign, a campaign almost certainly undertaken with Mossadeq’s acquiescence  1952 – Mossadeq opens negotiations with the USSR to sell Iranian oil – enraged the Americans  July 1952 – Mossadeq accepted the support of the Iranian communist party, the Tudehs  Mossadeq begins to operate more openly with the support of the Communist – their power is growing - > seemed to confirm that Mossadeq was becoming a tool of the Communist party  Oct. 1952 – Mossadeq dissolves the Iranian parliament entirely  State Department feared that similar events to the 1948 Czech coup d’etat were unfolding in Iran  May 1953 – Mossadeq rigs an election o Looked to Eisenhower like a clear Communist tactic 10 Operation AJAX  Americans ruled out armed intervention but officials had the sense that change could be affected in the Iranian political system – covert operations were a possible solution  Operation AJAX was a collaboration between the CIA and MI6  1952 – MI6 had invited Kermit Roosevelt, head of CIA’s Near East and Africa Division, to discuss possible plans to overthrow Mossadeq  Plan o Shah would fly to a remote town on the Caspian Sea o He would leave behind two decrees:  One dismissing Mossadeq as PM  One naming Fazlollah Zahedi as his successor o Two Iranian businessmen were given some $100,000 to build a supporting mob from athletic club thugs and the poor of south Teheran  MI6 and CIA use their agents in Iran to spread propaganda, bribe politicians and religious leaders  July 1953 – Roosevelt goes to Iran, makes contact with the agents that are run by MI6 – is driven to the Shah’s palace, hidden under blankets  The Shah is very indecisive however he is finally convinced of the plan by Roosevelt – signs the two proposed decrees and leaves the country  Plan goes totally awry – Mossadeq arrests the colonel who was supposed to deliver his dismissal o Announces that foreign elements had attempted a coup, and that Mossadeq had been compelled to take all power in his hands  Mobs take to the streets in support of Mossadeq  Americans call Mossadeq and threaten withdraw all American citizens – thus making Mossadeq appear incapable of governing – if he doesn’t stabilize the country o Mossadeq agrees with the demand and sends police to break up the Tudeh mobs  Iranian army decides to side with the Shah – Mossadeq resigns  Aug. 21, 1953 – Mossadeq surrenders to General Zahedi  Aug. 24, 1953 - Shah returns to Iran  AIOC nationalization decree is reversed  Mossadeq is put on trial and sentenced to house arrest Conclusions  It seemed AJAX was a huge success o Operation was cheap; only cost a few million dollars o CIA only numbered a few number of people in Iran o Americans were able to uphold plausible deniability  Problems and Concerns: o Americans had broken their commitment to democracy – had overthrown democratically elected gov’t 11 o Blowback to operations – AJAX becomes part of the driving fuel to the Iranian Revolution in 1979 o Americans were, in fact, very lucky – the plot that they initially drew up failed  However, Americans still got the result they were looking for  CIA takes the lesson that weak third world governments could be toppled very easily; reaffirmed the belief in covert operations  Iran provides a template for covert operations o Go into a country, find an opposition group, distribute propaganda, instigate a political crisis Guatemala 1954 – Operation PBSUCCESS Prelude  In 1950, Jacobo Arb
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