Study Guides (248,644)
Canada (121,651)
History (276)
HIS343Y1 (5)
Final

HIS 343 - Summary of Concepts and Lectures for the Exam.docx

13 Pages
215 Views

Department
History
Course Code
HIS343Y1
Professor
Brandon King

This preview shows pages 1,2,3. Sign up to view the full 13 pages of the document.
Description
HIS 343 NOTES: Establishment of Espionage  Three P’s:  Permanence  Remains a mainstay beyond 1900  Profession  Viewing espionage as a profession, a legitimate career, helps ensure its existence  Power  Espionage is linked to power, catching your opponent off-guard  Method of securing and tipping the balance of power  Intelligence is the method of collection, analysis and dissemination  Espionage in Britain:  Fear of overextension  Consideration of imperial rivalries  Boer War showed British weakness, and the Boxer Rebellion demonstrated the perils of overextension  Five Spheres:  Domestic security, popular culture, international system, impacts of science of war and imperial rivalry  M16/SIS created in 1909  Britain wants to weed out spies internally – popular culture scare of invasion by German spies and other undesirables  Chain reaction of spying between Germany and England  Initial creation of an intelligence system is based on fear and misjudgement of intentions – its created out of the fear that one exists to antagonize the party affected  Intelligence fades after WW1 – it is forgotten  Battle of Jutland:  Naval battle that took place May 1915, British intercept German message about a naval ambush – British are able to deploy and avoid the destruction of their navy – fail to use intelligence beyond the initial alert – fail to capitalize on opportunity, could have destroyed the entire German Navy  British leadership missed an opportunity – demonstrated the idea that intelligence is only good if the decision makers use it properly!  Zimmerman Telegram:  British intercept a German telegram to the Mexicans / Japanese, which encouraged them to side with Germany and to attack the US  British hand the Americans the intelligence, secretly, make them think they discovered it – Americans became very pro-war and want to strike back at Germany  Post WW1:  Intelligence disappears  Development of covert operations – namely against the Bolsheviks  West wanted to remove Lenin – wanted to support Kerensky’s side  Needed quick action to put Lenin down – covert operation seemed plausible  SIDNEY REILLY wanted to overthrow Lenin- then run the country himself  Reilly tried to bribe the Bolshevik soldiers, but they turned his plot over to Lenin  The operation ends in the spring of 1918, it was penetrated and flushed out by Lenin and his Bolsheviks  Creation of the Soviet Intelligence System  Related to Reilly and his madman plot  Bolsheviks never wanted a spy system at their creation, but the actions of the West demonstrated the immediate need for one  Designed an internal security system designed to protect the party from internal threats – THE CHEKA  Created for internal subversion and external wrecking  Fear of counter revolutionaries on the part of the West – felt like they were always under threat internally and externally  Fear of the intelligence system in Russia – system must remain loyal to the party – special relationship  TWO STEPS: Collection, then the info was passed to the leadership for them to make their own analysis and choices  System did not try to find capabilities, just weed out subversion and counter revolutionaries – survival of the party  Soviet system avoids international conflicts – seeks to protect the country at home  Interwar Period – 1930s  British misjudge the German capabilities – they use a PRECONCIEVED NOTION THAT THE GERMANS WILL REARM USING A BRITISH MODEL  Germans have no navy in the interwar period, according to the British intelligence and their assessments  German air force had no long range bombers, and didn’t seem ready to go to war in 1939 – British didn’t see the change in the German strategy – that they would favour tactical air support helping the land army  German lacked tanks, British didn’t foresee a change in strategy – the Blitz, etc  British concluded that the Germans were not ready for war, and this was a realistic assessment based on their analysis BUT it showed the problem with basing intelligence off a standard system  Germany lacked iron ore, rubber, and petro – could not fight a modern war  British failed to understand that Hitler would go to war to get these materials  The British assessment was accurate, but they relied far too much on the mirror assessment and it caused them to misjudge the intentions of the Germans  British failed to account for the irrationality of Hitler – he wanted what he wanted, he wanted war to get the supplies and he saw deterrence as weakness  Operation Barbarossa:  Soviets caught off guard by a large scale German invasion  Soviet intelligence system collected, disseminated and then analyzed by top leaders  Stalin didn’t want to antagonize Germans – believed in the non-aggression pact, and wanted more time to build up for a future conflict  Germans invade Russia, who is unprepared, and caught completely off guard – Stalin was warned, but he refused to believe the warnings – thought they were Western subversion, or his enemies trying to weaken him  Soviets warned by British, Americans, Churchill himself, etc  Stalin believed Germany would not attack Russia until Britain was defeated  Intelligence system failed to judge the intentions of the Germans who were caught in a stalemate in Britain, struggling to deliver the final blow – they turn their attention to Russia  Classic case of the decision makers blundering useful intelligence  German Deception:  Want to convince Soviets that they will not invade  Tell them that the 3 million troops near the border are only to deceive the British  Claim that operation sea lion – the invasion of the channel is their goal  Reassured Stalin who had preconceived notions about the German intentions!  Sorgy a famous spy warned the Russians that war was coming  Stalin refused to believe his intelligence, called them all traitors  SOVIET INTELLIGENCE WORKED WELL DURING COLLECTION BUT BROKE DOWN DURING THE ANALYSIS AND DISSEMINATION PHASE  American Intelligence in WW2 – Pearl Harbour:  Before the invasion – US believed Japan could be isolated from Europe and that a war over imperialism with Japan regarding the Pacific would happen eventually  US was neutral at the time, and they believed they could stay this course for the time being  Japan had made advances in China, mainly in Manchuria, and they believed they were the masters of the Pacific region  Japan believed the US wasn’t a military power – no strong military tradition, not unitary, not homogenous and politically weak because it was a democracy  Yamamoto tried to convince the Japanese not to go to war with US – knew they were stronger in a prolonged war  Japanese want to score a quick victory to discourage the Americans from WW2 – force them to sit out and recover  Pearl Harbour creates the need for an intelligence apparatus – must avoid a Pearl Harbour from ever happening again  Americans intercept enigma in the summer of 1941, begin their code breaking practice  Americans used a MIRROR ASSESSMENT for Japan  PRE-CONCIEVED NOTIONS:  Americans questioned what they would do if THEY were Japan  Japan was seen as economically weaker, overstretched, lacked raw materials for war, they weren’t white?, and the Americans outgunned them  War seemed improbable – would only make an opportunistic move  Roosevelt believed Japan would strike the weak imperial powers in the Pacific, Britain and France  Didn’t think the Japanese could take the US head on, and this was true  US believed Pearl Harbour type of attack WOULD NOT HAPPEN  Why it’s a Failure:  Failure of a young American intelligence system  Too much reliance on SIGINT – didn’t use enough IMINT or HUMINT  Use an unreliable method to assess Japan  The Success of Midway:  Big difference when compared to Pearl Harbour – US was on the defensive now – needed intelligence to sway an advantage in its favour  Americans knew of Japanese positions at Midway, wanted to stage a counter-attack  Japanese had no intelligence on the Americans  Japanese wanted to attack Midway, and to draw the Americans into a trap – Americans knew of it and were able to set their own trap  Allowed the Americans to conduct a surprise attack which crippled the Japanese navy, and commenced their downfall in the Pacific  Japanese lost 4 aircraft carriers, 1,200-1,500 carrier born aircraft, and many pilots / technicians  Americans lost a lot too, but they were able to recover due to a larger war capacity  Allied Deception: Operation Fortitude – North (Norway) South (Calais):  British capture all German agents, they aren’t as good as the British spies – allows them to create a double-agent system – use the captured Germans as double-agents  Twenty Committee XX Committee – Double Cross – agents provide some real information in order to make them seem valuable and useful  Intelligence in Germany was used for political leverage, it was not used to the advantage of the army or the state – caused it to be highly ineffective  The Cold War – CIA:  CIA created in 1947 – early on, heavily focused on SIGINT  Pearl Harbour helped ensure its survival post war – must avoid surprises  Office of Strategic Services (OSS) precursor to CIA seeks to  create spy networks in Europe and Asia,  create a subversive and covert operation branch and it would  provide research and analysis  Early Cold War Scandals:  Gouzenko Affair:  Revealed that the west was vulnerable to penetration – Gouzenko was spying on the Canadians – RCMP unable to deal with it, call in the Americans / British – demonstrated the need for an intelligence agency to fight off enemy spies and to deal with these type of situations  Cambridge Five:  Kim Philby, Donald Maclean, Guy Burgess, Anthony Blunt and Klaus Fuchs all spied on the west and reported their findings  Philby worked for M16 and was in a high position  Fuchs worked on the bomb and passed info on to the Soviets too  All of these men worked for the Soviets  VENONA Program:  Deciphered many messages that were full of secret knowledge of the Americans  Philby warns Soviet spies that they are closed to being captured  Significance:  Soviets had an early advantage over Americans – they had an already established intelligence system with networks and contacts  Soviets were far more efficient at collecting, and had even stole information about the bomb – American urgency to protect themselves against this  VENONA showed the need for a strong intelligence system to deal with threats  Italian Coup:  Fund pro west pro Christian and pro American regimes in Italy to curb communism  By the 1950s the Americans believe they are stronger at intelligence then the Soviet Union – CIA separated from politics, Soviet Union was analyzed only by Stalin  Americans turn away from HUMINT, turn towards SIGINT and IMINT – CIA collected via machines, not humans  Spyplanes would provide hard numbers, and humans would guess the intentions  Americans zigzagged development of the CIA allows them to make mistakes and improve upon them – they develop an intelligence system that is better suited to deal with a multitude of threats, not only a singular threat  Soviet Intelligence in the Cold War:  Heavily relied on HUMINT  No lessons learned from Operation Barbarossa as the blame was on Stalin and it was not up for discussion  Believe the US is trying to end communism  Failures:  KGB struggles to adapt to the Cold War – reliance on HUMINT hurts the Soviet Union – not as effective as IMINT and SIGINT  West reforms its intelligence system, the Soviets do not  Closure of OSS, development of CIA, etc  SU at the mercy of the west if their contacts and networks run dry, which they do  Soviet spies found it difficult to clear all the background, loyalty and security checks  Post WW2, not as many willing volunteers to help the Soviet Union spy on the west  VENONA made it difficult to spy on the west  CIA learns from Eastern Europe failures, KGB does not learn from its failures  KGB fixed on subversion, don’t track international developments as strongly, lack the resources as their system is focused on purely defense  U2 Spyplane helped the Americans maintain superiority in IMINT  SU based their assumptions on ideology which gave them an incorrect image of the US intentions  Cold War was unequal between US and SU – KGB suffered from lack of analytical capability – rely heavily on HUMINT which is the riskiest form of intelligence gathering and the one that is prone to the most mistakes  East German Stasi:  Created in the 1950s, main intelligence service of the East German government  Created out of perceived American subversion  Stasi takes on a KGB type model  ROMEOS (male Stasi agents) would marry West German ladies related to NATO and high power positions in order to gain information  West Germany struggled to penetrate into East – due to the web of surveillance  Sword and Shield of the party, not the nation (like the KGB)  The Golden Age of Covert Operations:  With the arrival of the Soviet bomb, Americans can’t rely solely on military might, see covert operations as a viable method  CIA acting on commands from Eisenhower – part of his New Look policy, military on the cheap  Operation Ajax, Iran 1953:  Classic struggle between US / SU in a proxy setting  Eisenhower backs the Shah in a military coup against Mossadeq  Mossadeq wanted US help, refused by them, turns to SU  Two CIA agents were funded, 100k each – were to cause unrest and build up an anti Mossadeq mob  Mob is out of control, pro-Mossadeq, Americans ask him to calm the mob down as it is threatening Americans there, he complies, new mobs break out, army gets fed up and asks Mossadeq to resign  Zahedi, the pro-west candidate comes to power, rides in on a tank  Significance:  Relatively cheap, compared to sending troops in  Took only 6 months  Handful of CIA operatives accomplished the task  Plausible deniability was maintained  Americans break their democratic commitment to the world, they topple a democratically elected government and cause long term problems in Iran  Americans misjudged the popularity of Mossadeq  Operation Ajax provides the model for covert operations  Operation PBSUCCESS, Guatemala, 1954:  Jacobo Arbenz elected democratica
More Less
Unlock Document

Only pages 1,2,3 are available for preview. Some parts have been intentionally blurred.

Unlock Document
You're Reading a Preview

Unlock to view full version

Unlock Document

Log In


OR

Join OneClass

Access over 10 million pages of study
documents for 1.3 million courses.

Sign up

Join to view


OR

By registering, I agree to the Terms and Privacy Policies
Already have an account?
Just a few more details

So we can recommend you notes for your school.

Reset Password

Please enter below the email address you registered with and we will send you a link to reset your password.

Add your courses

Get notes from the top students in your class.


Submit