Business Administration 1220E Study Guide - Quiz Guide: Yield Management, Anthropocentrism, Ecosystem Services

• School: Western University
• Department: Business Administration
• Course: Business Administration 1220E
• Professor: Alexander Miller

Document Summary

Ostrom collective action and the evolution of social norms. Zero contribution thesis: individuals need external rules to fulfill their long-term self interest because individually, they cannot overcome collective action problems. People are self-interested and government policies can be frustrating unwillingness to cooperate: free riding. Two types of norm-using public good game players: conditional cooperators willing to cooperate if they think others will, willing punishers will use resources to give costly punishments or reciprocate rewards. Different approaches: direct evolutionary approach: we evolved to be more successful cooperators, indirect evolutionary approach: we begin with a certain disposition an then adapt to norms. Externally imposed rules tend to crowd endogenous cooperative behavior. A social norm (with intraparty communication can generate as much cooperation as external rules and sanctions (worst situation externally imposed rules are weakly monitoring and sanctioning) Read: mea ch 2 and 6, redford and adams, skroch and lopes-hoffman.