EC260 Study Guide - Final Guide: Market Power, Oligopoly

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Then firm 1 sees its profit function as: pi1 (y1;y2)= p(y1+y2)y1 c1(y1, an equilibrium is when each firm"s output level is a best response to the other firm"s output level for then neither wants to deviate from its output level, a pair of output levels (y1*,y2*) is a cournot nash equilibrium if, y1*=r1(y2*) & y2*=r2(y1*, y1*=r1(y2*)= 15 1/4y2* and y2*=r2(y1*)= (45 y1*)/4. Firm one is the leader: leader commits to an output before all other firms, remaining firms are followers, they choose their outputs to maximize profits given the leader"s output, q2 is the follower, leader uses this reaction function to determine its profit maximizing output level: q1 = (a+c2 2c1)/2b. Conclusion: different olipoloy scenarios gives rise to different optimal strategies and different outcomes, choices, beliefs about the reactions of rivals, your choice variable (p or q), nature of the product market, your ability to credibly commit prior to your rivals.

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