PHIL-215 Chapter Notes - Chapter Lewis: Fallibilism, If And Only If, Epistemic Closure
Document Summary
It is just this: it seems as if knowledge must be by definition infallible. Soon you find that uneliminated possibilities of error are everywhere. Those possibilities of error are far-fetched, of course, but possibilities all the same. Argues better fallibilism than scepticism; falliable knowledge may be the only kind we have. Still thinks he dodge falliabilism and come up with an account of knowledge. But lewis cannot subscribe to this account of the context-dependence of knowledge, because he questions its starting point. --doesn"t agree that the mark of knowledge is justification; this answer is not context sensitive. First, because justification is not sufficient: your true opinion that you will lose the lottery isn"t knowledge, whatever the odds. In some cases the level of surety of knowledge needs to be far higher (ie that the cake has no peanuts in it) vs other cases (that the cake icing is exactly 1 cm thick)
