ECON 1050 Chapter 15: Economics-1 (1) (dragged) 8

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The equilibrium of this r&d game of chicken is for one firm to do the r&d. But we cannot tell which firm will do the r&d and which will not, If a game is played repeatedly, it is possible for duopolists to successfully collude and make a monopoly profit. If the players take turns and move sequentially, many outcomes are possible. Also additional punishment strategies enable the firms to comply and achieve a cooperative equilibrium, in which the firms make and share the monopoly profit. One possible punishment strategy is a tit-for-tat strategy. A tit-for-tat strategy is one in which one player cooperates this period if the other player cooperated in the previous period but cheats in the current period if the other player cheated in the previous period. A move severe punishment strategy is a trigger strategy.

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