CAMPBELL EXPERIENTIAL HIGHLIGHTING
Conscious attention can be causing the selection of info relating to just a specific objto control
the subjects verbal reports about that obj.
Content of conscious experience must be capable of identifying info relating to just the obj in
various processing streams. hence, exp of location will be critical to allowing slection of just the
INTUITION AND EXPLANATION
direct way of interpreting demonstrative= look at which thing is being talked about. Knowledge
is provided by experience of the thing. What matters is to single the thing out visually, as a
figure against a background. Understanding demonstratives depends on the act of VISUAL
Blindseer example, the issue is whether the BS has the same way of interpreting the
demonstrative as the ordinary subject has. Whether consciousness of the object is not completely
Conscious attention to the object is needed for an understanding of the demonstrative. If this is
true then the next problem is to gain theoretical understanding of why that should be so.
Foveating, small part of the retina called fovea, more info is received.
But the problem is not about the quantity of information received.
attention shift could be overt or covert. Movements vs fixed.
explanation of the role of CA in providing kor :not about quantity Austria2
so how to characterize the role of CA?
2 points to explain CA's role;
1) relational character of experience of the object= object snt causing some experiential state in
the person. Rather, the experience is making the object itself available to the subject. Exp of the
obj makes the object itself available to the subject.
2) There is the functional role of conscious attention. One is able to keep track of the
person/object over time, one is able to answer questions about the person/object though visual
there is a need for an account of relationship between the 2 points. This relation is provided by
the idea of a way of attending to the object which is both relational and individuated and needed
in an account of functionsal role
conscious attention allows for one person to keep track of object, to answer questions about the
object being experienced, and to act on it. This is CA's functional role
2 explanations are legitimate but can be mistaken.
1) square because it looks square; common sense
2) square because the cell firing in v3 registers squareness in that location; scientific
info-processing explantions challenge the unity of philosopher's idea of representational state=
beliefs desires. but the representational state postulated in IP explanations are not beliefs and
Choamsky argues that there is a unitary notion of representational state when analyzing the
grammatical structure of a heard sentence. The only difference is that some states are accessible
to consciousness and some not. But the distinction is of no particular theoretical interest.
Searle argues that there is only one kind of representation and it is linked to consciousness. It
does not make sense to talk about other kinds of representational states. This view proposes that
IP explanations are problematic. Intentionality is only compatible with states that are accessible
Cautious view: at least 2 types of representations
1)conceptual contents (desire, beliefs) to which consciousness may constitutively attach.
2)Non conceptual contents of IP states.
Conceptual content= demonstrative conte