WDW152H1 Chapter Notes - Chapter 4: Scientific American, Kin Selection
12 May 2018
School
Department
Course
Professor
“Technological Theories,” W&P, 128.
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People are selfish --> why cooperate?
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International politics not governed by central authority
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Hobbes : central authority to control / police
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To everyone's advantage
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People cooperate when they expect cooperation in return
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Assumption of self-interest is just an assumption that concern for others does not completely solve
when to cooperate
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Will typically defect --> how to get to cooperate?
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No mechanism to make enforceable threats / commitments
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No way to be sure of other player's move
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Can't eliminate other player or run away - must decide
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No way to change other player's payoff
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Player's not concerned for future - other player might move at any time - only want immediate
payoff
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Can't assume other player is out to get you
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The more likely future interaction is, more likely to cooperate
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Benefits may not be the same for both parties
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Exclusion of possibility of verbal communication, direct influence of 3rd parties, problems of
implementing choice, uncertainty about player's previous move
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Avoidance of necessary conflict by cooperating as long as the other player does
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Revocability in the face of an uncalled for defection by other
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Forgiveness after responding to a provocation
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Thus cooperation can occur without central authority
Clarity of behaviour so other people can adapt to you
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Four common properties
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Prisoner's dilemma : can come out ahead or worse off
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Robert Axelrod, “The Evolution of Cooperation,” in H&H 175-185.
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Differs between societies
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Direct reciprocity : evolution of cooperation among individuals who encounter one another repeatedly
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Neighbours form clusters of cooperators, becoming more competitive with defectors
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Spatial selection : not uniformly distributed
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Kin selection : making sacrifices for relatives
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Indirect reciprocity : one individual helps another based on the needy individual's reputation --> they
help others
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Group selection : individuals being selfless for the good of all
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Mechanisms occur in all organisms - cooperation is a driving force in evolution of life
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Language and indirect reciprocity (reputation)
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Public goods : many people defect --> environmental issues
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Humans are most cooperative --> achieved most
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More generous when publicly donate (reputation at stake)
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People need to be convinced environment is a real problem
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Cooperation is intrinsically unstable
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Martin A. Nowak, “Why We Help,” Scientific American (July 2012), 34-39. Follow either of these links to find
it in the U of T library system: http://simplelink.library.utoronto.ca/url.cfm/412266 or
http://web.ebscohost.com.myaccess.library.utoronto.ca/ehost/detail?sid=707c9861-
a677-4945-875d-1fce45fe4693%40sessionmgr115&vid=1&hid=126&bdata=JnNpdGU9ZWhvc3QtbGl2ZQ%
3d%3d#db=buh&AN=77340785
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Reading 2.4: Cooperation I: Nuclear Deterrence
February 1, 2017
7:06 PM
READINGS Page 1
Document Summary
Hobbes : central authority to control / police. Robert axelrod, the evolution of cooperation, in h&h 175-185. People cooperate when they expect cooperation in return. Assumption of self-interest is just an assumption that concern for others does not completely solve when to cooperate. Prisoner"s dilemma : can come out ahead or worse off. No mechanism to make enforceable threats / commitments. No way to be sure of other player"s move. Can"t eliminate other player or run away - must decide. Player"s not concerned for future - other player might move at any time - only want immediate payoff. Can"t assume other player is out to get you. The more likely future interaction is, more likely to cooperate. Benefits may not be the same for both parties. Exclusion of possibility of verbal communication, direct influence of 3rd parties, problems of implementing choice, uncertainty about player"s previous move. Avoidance of necessary conflict by cooperating as long as the other player does.
