POLI 354 Lecture Notes - Lecture 4: Sunset Provision, United Nations Convention Against Torture, Best Alternative To A Negotiated Agreement
13 May 2018
School
Department
Course
Professor
POLI%358%Notes% % % Winter%2018%
Poli%358%Lecture%4:%How%and%why%do%states%join%international%agreements%%
18th%January%2018%
%
Legend:%normal%text-%from%slides;%!"#$!%&'()*#"("*+(,-./+&&.-(&#!0(!1(%$#&&2(.3+-(#10(#4.3+("*+(&$!0+&(
%
Table%of%contents%
- Fearon’s%model-%").(&"#5+&(./(%..,+-#"!.16(4#-5#!1!15(#10(+1/.-%+7+1"%
o 8.3+-(9+#-.1:&(-+#0!15(!1(0+"#!$(/.-("*+(7!0"+-7%
- Issue%linkage%
o ;#3!&:(#-"!%$+(<==>(
- The%case%of%convention%against%torture%%
%
Recap:%
- HST-%*+5+7.1(%#1(+&"#4$!&*(%..,+-#"!.1%
o Hegemonic%power%and%monetary%stability%
o Hegemonic%power%and%trade%openness%
- Why%do%regimes%persist%after%the%hegemon%declines?%
o K%hegemons-%%#1(*#3+(7.-+("*#1(.1+(*+5+7.12(#&($.15(#&("*+?(*#3+(%.13+-5!15(
,-+/+-+1%+&(%
o Benefits%from%international%regimes%>%maintenance%costs%
o Establishment%costs%>%maintenance%costs%%
%
Fearon’s%model%
- Bargaining%stage:%states%bargain%to%choose%between%tow%enforceable%agreements.%This%
stage%is%model%as%a%war%of%attrition%game.%
o @+5."!#"+(#10(#5-++(.1(#(/!1#$("-+#"?%
o A++("*+(7.0+$(!&("*+()#-(./(#""-!"!.16(5.(".("*+("#4$+()*#"(,-+/+-+1%+&(#10(,B&*(/.-(
"*.&+(#&(7B%*(#&("*+?(%#1%
- Enforcement%stage:%states%implement%and%enforce%that%agreement.%This%stage%is%modeled%
as%a%repeated%prisoner’s%dilemma%game.%
o C5-++7+1"(*#&(4++1(-#"!/!+0%
o D.0+$6(,-!&.1+-&(0!$+77#&6(&*#0.)(./("*+(/B"B-+(,$#?&(#(4!5(-.$+%
%
Bargaining%Stage%
- Two%sides%holding%out%against%making%an%agreement,%and%incurring%costs,%until%one%side%
folds,%giving%the%other%a%preferable%deal%
- As%the%‘shadow%of%the%future’%grows%the%stakes%rise,%making%negotiations%longer%and%longer%
o E.15+-("*+(&*#0.)2(*#-0+-(!"()!$$(4+(".(4#-5#!1(4+%#B&+("*+(0+#$()!$$($#&"($.15+-(%
- In%cases%where%cooperation%is%expected%to%be%finite,%states%will%hold%out%less%long,%so%as%to%
enjoy%the%benefits%of%cooperation%sooner%
- Also,%states%with%lower%costs%of%non-%cooperation%will%tend%to%hold%out%longer%
o F.)+-(,$#?&(#(-.$+6(%.&"(./(1.16%..,+-#"!.1(!&(0!//+-+1"(4+")++1(%.B1"-!+&6($#-5+-(
%.B1"-!+&(%#1(*.$0(.1(#($!""$+(7.-+("*#1(&7#$$+-(%.B1"-!+&%
o A.(4!55+-(%.B1"-!+&:(,-+/+-+1%+&(#-+(-+,-+&+1"+0(4+""+-(!1("*+(#5-++7+1"&(%
%
BATNA%
- Best%alternative%to%a%negotiated%agreement%
o E#-5+-("*+(%.&"(./(1.16%..,+-#"!.1(/.-("*+(%.B1"-?2(&7#$$+-("*+(%.&"(./("*!&(.1+%
POLI%358%Notes% % % Winter%2018%
o GCH@C(!&(*!5*(/.-(%*!1#6(/#%+(&7#$$+-(%.&"&(./(1.16(%..,+-#"!.1("*#1(&7#$$+-(7#-I+"(%
- Time%value%of%money%
- Examples%
o Canada%negotiated%a%trade%deal%with%the%EU%
§ C4$+(".(+J"-#%"($."(./(4+1+/!"&(/-.7("*+(KL6(4+%#B&+(8#1#0#(#$-+#0?(*#&(
#%%+&&(".(LA2(&.(8#1#0#(1++0+0(%..,+-#"!.1()!"*("*+(KL($+&&M(%
o Canada%has%already%access%to%the%US%market%die%to%NAFTA%
o Canada%can%wait%longer%in%negotiating%the%deal%with%the%EU%
%
The%role%of%the%International%Institutions%
- Importance%of%international%regimes%as%forums%for%bargaining%through%3%mechanisms:%
o Setting%up%focal%points%and%establish%precedents%
§ 8.B1"-!+&(%..,+-#"+(#-.B10("*!&6NHO(-.B10&(.//+-(,-+%+0+1"&%
o Structure%the%bargaining%process%
§ A"-B%"B-+(/.-("*+(1+5."!#"!15(,-.%+&&%
o Raising%the%cost%of%failure,%since%failure%hurts%the%regime%as%well%as%the%states%
involved%
%
Enforcement%Stage%
- F-!&.1+-&(0!$+77#(&+""!15(
- In%cases%of%not%effective%monitoring%and%enforcement,%we%should%observe%
o Non-serious%bargaining/%1."(#"(#$$%
o Non%bargaining%at%all%
o C%".-&(#1"!%!,#"+()*#"(*#,,+1&(P("*+(+1/.-%+7+1"(&"#5+2(!/(!"(!&(1."(,.&&!4$+(".(
+1/.-%+("*+(#5-++7+1"2("*+1(4#-5#!1!15()!$$(1."(*#,,+1(3+-?(&+-!.B&$?(
o Example:%UN%framework%convention%on%climate%change%1992%%
- In%cases%of%effective%monitoring%and%enforcement,%we%should%observe:%
o Long%bargaining%process%
§ ;AD(!&(&+-!.B&6(%.B1"-!+&(I1.)("*+?(*#3+(".(0+$!3+-(.1(,-.7!&+&(%
o Examples:%Doha%round%%
%
The%role%of%international%institutions%
- importance%of%international%regimes%in%the%enforcement%phase%
o including%enforcement%mechanism%(DSM%in%the%WTO)%
o repeated%cooperation%
§ $.15+-("*+(&*#0.)(./("*+(/B"B-+2("*+(4+""+-(#10(+#&!+-(!"(!&(".(+1/.-%+(#10(
#5-++7+1"6(&"-.15+-(!&("*+(+1/.-%+7+1"(7+%*#1!&7%
§ "!"6/.-6"#"(".(*.$02(#%".-&(0.1:"(1++0(".(I1.)()*+1("*+(5#7+(&".,&%
o monitoring%–%&"#"+&(4+*#3!.B-%
%
Shadow%of%the%future%
- the%shadow%of%the%future%cuts%two%ways%
o where%the%shadow%is%short,%agreements%will%tend%not%to%be%enforceable%
§ 4#-5#!1!15(&"#5+6($.15(&*#0.)(!&(#(,#!1(!1("*+(1+%I6("*+("*!15()+(#5-++(.1(
)!$$(&"#?(/.-(#($.15("!7+2(&.(!/(!":&(#(4#0(0+#$2("*+(4#0(0+#$()!$$($#&"(/.-(#(3+-?(
$.15("!7+%
§ +5'(;.*#(-.B106("*+(;AD(!&(&"-.15(+1.B5*("*#"(P()!$$(*#3+(".(#%"B#$$?(0+$!3+-(%
POLI%358%Notes% % % Winter%2018%
§ 4B"($.15(&*#0.)(#$&.(7#I+&(+1/.-%+7+1"(7B%*(7B%*(+#&!+-M(D.-+("*+(
#5-++7+1"(#10("-+#"?(!&(!7,.&+0%
o where%the%shadow%is%long,%expect%costly%non-co-operation%where%we%would%expect%
cooperation%
- How%can%states%design%international%institutions%to%shorten%the%shadow%of%the%future?%
o ;+3!&+($.15(&*#0.)(!1(+1/.-%+7+1"(,*#&+2(4B"(&*.-"+1(!"(/.-("*+(4#-5#!1!15(&"#5+Q(%
o AB1&+"(%$#B&+6(#5-++7+1"(0.+&1:"(*.$0(/.-+3+-6(#5-++7+1"(+J,!-+&(#"(&.7+(,.!1"(./(
"!7+(%
o @C9HC6(*#&(1+JB&6(%.B1"-!+&(-+3!&!"(!&&B+&(0B+(".("+%*1.$.5!%#$(%*#15+2(4B"(1.(
&B1&+"(%$#B&+M(LA(B&B#$$?(1+3+-(*#&(&B1&+"(%$#B&+&(R(.1%+(#("-+#"?(!&(-#"!/!+0(4?(
%.15-+&&(!":&(!1(,$#%+(/.-+3+-2("*+(.1$?(+J%+,"!.1(!&("*+(S!+"1#76LA("-#0+(#5-++7+1"(
#10("*#"(4+%#B&+(S!+"1#7(!&(#(&"#"+(+%.1.7?M(%
o WTO%
%
Example:%Re-negotiations%
- renegotiations%as%a%way%to%break%the%shadow%of%the%future%
o %.B1"-!+&(7#?(#5-++(.1(&B46.,"!7#$("+-7&(4+%#B&+("*+?(I1.)("*#"("*+?(%#1(-+6
1+5."!#"+(!1(&B4&+TB+1"(-.B10&M(%
o O-!5!1#$(!0+#(./(*#3!15(-.B10&6(".(7#I+("*+($.15(&*#0.)(./("*+(/B"B-+(1."(#//+%"("*+(
1+5."!#"!.1&(!1("..(7B%*(./(#(4#0()#?M(%
- easier%to%reach%cooperation%
- obviously%not%working%with%the%Doha%round%%
%
Selection%effect%
- if%monitoring%and%enforcement%is%not%feasible%for%a%given%issue,%we%will%not%observe%
attempts%at%negotiation%on%that%issue%because%states%cannot%come%to%an%agreement%%
- we%only%see%serious%negotiations%in%cases%where%both%sides%believe%that%monitoring%and%
enforcement%can%be%effective%
o %.B1"-!+&()!$$(1."(1+5."!#"+(!/("*+(#5-++7+1"(!&(1."(5.!15(".(4+(+1/.-%+0(%
%
Different%Problems%in%each%states%
- Veto%players-%#1?(#%".-()*.(*#&(#(&#?(.1(#(,#-"!%B$#-(,.$!%?6(B&B#$$?("*+(UB0!%!#$(&?&"+7%
o Make%more%difficult%the%bargaining%stage%#"($+#&"(.1+(./("*+(3+".(,$#?+-&(%#1(*#3+(
0!3+-5!15(,-+/+-+1%+&M(%
o Make%easier%the%enforcement%stage%*+$,!15(".(+1/.-%+("*+(#5-++7+1"6(!":&(#(4B1%*(
./($#)&(-#"!/!+0(#"("*+(0.7+&"!%($+3+$6(*#3+(".(4+(+1/.-%+0(4?("*+(UB0!%!#$(&?&"+7(V/.-(
+J#7,$+W(%
o E#-5+(1B74+-(./(3+".(,$#?+-&(7#I+&(!"(0!//!%B$"(".(7.3+(#)#?(/-.7("*+(&"#"B&(TB.2(
4B"(!"(7#I+&(!"(+#&!+-(".(+1/.-%+("*+(#5-++7+1"M(%
- Number%of%actors%($#-5+(X(./(%.B1"-!+&(1+5."!#"!15)%
o Make%more%difficult%the%bargaining%stage%
§ E#-5+-(X(./(%.B1"-!+&2(7.-+(0!3+-&+(#-+("*+(,-+/+-+1%+&2(*#-0+-(".(#5-++M%
§ 8K;C(0+#0$.%I(/.-(Y(7.1"*&6(&7#$$(-+5!.1(!1(G+$5!B7(0!01:"(#5-++()!"*(&.7+(
./("*+(,-+/+-+1%+&%
§ C$&.(*#3+(/-++(-!0!15(,-.4$+76(%
§ 5+"($.)+&"(0+1.7!1#".-(%..,+-#"!.16(*#$$.)(#5-++7+1"&%
o Make%easier%the%enforcement%stage%%
§ NHO6(&.(7#1?(%.B1"-!+&6(7#I+(!"(+#&!+-(".(7.1!".-%
Document Summary
Poli 358 lecture 4: how and why do states join international agreements. Legend: normal text- from slides; italics: what the professor said in class, over and above the slides. Fearon"s model- two stages of cooperation- bargaining and enforcement: cover fearon"s reading in detail for the midterm. Hst- hegemon can establish cooperation: hegemonic power and monetary stability, hegemonic power and trade openness. Why do regimes persist after the hegemon declines: k hegemons- can have more than one hegemon, as long as they have converging preferences, benefits from international regimes > maintenance costs, establishment costs > maintenance costs. Bargaining stage: states bargain to choose between tow enforceable agreements. Enforcement stage: states implement and enforce that agreement. This stage is modeled as a repeated prisoner"s dilemma game: agreement has been ratified, model- prisoners dilemmas- shadow of the future plays a big role. Two sides holding out against making an agreement, and incurring costs, until one side folds, giving the other a preferable deal.
