Political Science 2191A/B Lecture Notes - Lecture 3: Mutual Assured Destruction, Daniel Ellsberg, Thomas Schelling
28 Apr 2019
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2191 Week 3 Notes
• Intro to Game Theory
o Game theory rationally and dispassionately examines the strategic behavior of
nations
o Game theoretical models illuminate the underlying structure of conflict
o Game models can explain and describe situations and also be used to prescribe
o Used by think tanks and institutions in US
• Why is Game theory Sexy?
o Quasi Mathematical
o Language conceals underlying political realities
• Why is Game theory important to IR
o Illuminates the logic of structural relations
o Based on the shared ideas and concepts which contribute to IR language/Jargon
o Illuminates the abstractions of strategizing and underlying assumption of
strategic studies
o Clarifies assumptions about rationality which underlie military & economic
thinking
o Helps generate options and alternative strategies such as Tit for Tat
• Important Concept
o Matrix & Matrices (Boxes)
o Payoff (Numbers)
o Outcome
• Chicken or Deterrence Game
o Cooperate or threaten
o Sam = US & Ivan = Russia
o Developed by Daniel Ellsberg, Rand thinktank
o Two drivers drive at each other
o First driver who swerves loses
o Both drivers are losers if they collide
o Big assumption is to play the game
o Consider all the worst possible consequences of each choice
o Mini-Max principle – Choose so as to avid the worst conceivable outcome
▪ Look for the payoff where my minimal payoff is maximal
▪ Look to make the decision which makes the best of the worst behaviour
of my opponent
o Strategists’ Problem
▪ Given that Us would back down a strategy of mutual assured destruction
wasn’t credible
▪ USSR would threaten war knowing that the US wouldn’t save berlin if war
▪ How can we credibly threaten to use nuclear weapons so as to make
deterrence work
• Thomas Schelling, Bernard Brodie, Doomsday machine
o Rank ordering Possible outcomes
▪ 4-1, 4 being the best and 1 is the worst
o Nato Vs Serbia in Chicken Game
o George Bush vs Saddam Hussein
o Those in favour of unilateral first strikes tend not to appreciate the potential
interplay of both players choices
▪ They also tend to forget that the other player may more highly value
another outcome
o Commonsense
▪ Why not simply refrain from making threates where the probable costs of
carrying out the threat could outweigh the benefits obtained from going
to the brink
• Prisoner’s Dilemma
o Illustrates how the structure of the situation can lead to insecurity on both sides
leading to the brink
o Why we continue to wonder about how we can use credible threats
o Demonstrates we are caught in a dilemma due to structural imperatives and
worst-case thinking
o The worst case outcome is 10 years in jail and then both will tattle and both are
jailed for 5 years
o Demonstrates why arms spirals can develop
▪ Why sanctions may be undermined
▪ Why the arms industry thrives
▪ Why nuclear technology proliferates
o Shows how we can become caught in dilemmas due to our desire to avoid the
worst case scenario at all costs
o Based on our unwillingness to risk the costs of cooperating if the other guy
doesn’t cooperate
o Each player is unwilling to risk the costs of cooperating if the other player also
does not cooperate
o Generating solutions about cooperation
o Strategies derived from Game theory
▪ Promote Trust and improve communication
• Anwar Sadat
▪ Verify
• Developed increased verification capabilities
• Negotiate verification schedules
▪ Change the Pay-offs
• Make arms racing more expensive
• Promote the view that agreement can incur benefits & reduce
expenses
▪ Develop strategies based on iterated Prisoners Dilemma
• No end date because countries are forever
• Anatol Rapoport’s “Tit for Tat” winning strategy
