ECON 3430 Lecture Notes - Lecture 10: Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation, Financial Regulation, Arbitrage

20 views5 pages
hussam.sw and 39351 others unlocked
ECON 3430 Full Course Notes
15
ECON 3430 Full Course Notes
Verified Note
15 documents

Document Summary

Before deposit insurance, depositors would have to wait until the bank was liquidated. Unable to asset quality of bank assets, depositors would withdrawal money even from good banks. This is described as a bank run: methods to handle a failed bank. The canada mortgage and housing corporation did this. The u. s. treasury (and others) did this as well: governments can also take over (nationalize) troubled institutions and guarantee all (cid:272)reditors" loa(cid:374)s (cid:449)ill (cid:271)e paid i(cid:374) full, moral hazard and adverse selection issues. A government safety net can be a mixed blessing: moral hazard. Depositors do not impose discipline of marketplace. Financial institutions have an incentive to take on greater risk: adverse selection. Depositors have little reason to monitor financial institutions: (cid:862)too big to fail(cid:863) qua(cid:374)dary, regulators are reluctant to close down large financial institutions and impose loses on their creditors because doing so might precipitate a financial crisis.

Get access

Grade+20% off
$8 USD/m$10 USD/m
Billed $96 USD annually
Grade+
Homework Help
Study Guides
Textbook Solutions
Class Notes
Textbook Notes
Booster Class
40 Verified Answers
Class+
$8 USD/m
Billed $96 USD annually
Class+
Homework Help
Study Guides
Textbook Solutions
Class Notes
Textbook Notes
Booster Class
30 Verified Answers

Related Documents

Related Questions