PHIL 1100 Lecture Notes - Lecture 15: Christian Conditionalism
25 Aug 2016
School
Department
Course
Professor
Document Summary
John martin fischer (1994), why immortality is not so bad. This essay is a reply to bernard williams"s essay, our previous reading. He begins by isolating two criteria from williams"s discussion on what is needed for a desirable immortality. The identity condition : the future person must be numerically identical with the present person and must be recognizable as such: multiple different meanings for identical. An important distinction in philosophical debates on personal identity is between numerical identity and qualitative identity. Numerous philosophers and theologians have missed this distinction: e. g. friedrich nietzsche. Thought the universe plays and replays over and over with us the same way that it is now e. g. john hick. When i die, somewhere else a perfect physical and mental copy of me pops up somewhere else (same idea as heaven) e. g. prof. coleman. Williams"s main focus was on the attractiveness condition. In this section fischer focuses his criticism on the identity condition.
