Locke on Freedom of the Will
Free Action = Able to do or not to do in accordance with one’s volition/how one wills
But, what we will is DETERMINED
Our volitions acaused by our desires
There is some fact that serves to fix our choices
The unknowing prisoner
I freely stay in the room; my staying issues from my choice.
My staying counts as a free action, even though it is not possible for me to leave.
For the compatibilist, we are always unknowingly trapped in a locked room.
Sometimes actions issue from choices, and these actions are called “free.”
But, thchoices could not have been other than they were.
Problem with Compatibilism
The question that motivated our debate was:
Is freedom, defined in the ordinary way as “the ability to do otherwise,” compatible with determinism?
The compatibilist has not shown that it is.
Rather, she has redefined freedom as “wholly caused noncompulsive behavior.”
This kind of freedom is compatible with determinism.
But, we normally think people are morally responsible for actions only when they could have done
otherwise. Is the Compatibilist’s new conception of freedom what is needed for moral responsibility?
Hume’s Reconciling Project (Compatibilist)
Freedom and moral responsibility can be reconciled with (causal) determinism.
Tries to capture a sense in which we could have done otherwise even though we are caused to do as we
Two kids of liberty (freedom):
Liberty of indifference
Lack of causation
Liberty of spontaneity
Lack of coercion
Freedom to do as one chooses or wills
Doing what one wants or chooses to do while free from the constraints or coercion of others
We are only responsible for our Free Actions.
But, free actions don’t require liberty of indifference.
Free actions do not require absence of causation
Free actions are those that are caused by the agent’s willings and desires.
We only hold people when their actions result from their own choices