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How has international trade changed since the end of World War II?

a. Trade across national borders has decreased since its peak during the early to mid-1900s.

b. International trade has increased steadily since this period of time.

c. The amount of international trading has remained relatively stable since this time.

d. International trade has become completely unrestricted.

e. International trading has become much more heavily regulated and restricted by all countries.

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Mahe Alam
Mahe AlamLv10
31 Mar 2021
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Related questions

After reading the February 19th, 2009 Economist article, "Turning their backs on the world," do you believe it is wise for world governments to shy away from globalization during a period of economic crisis?

Globalisation

Turning their backs on the world

Feb 19th 2009 From The Economist print edition

The integration of the world economy is in retreat on almost every front

Illustration by Claudio Munoz

THE economic meltdown has popularised a new term: deglobalisation. Some critics of capitalism seem happy about it—like Walden Bello, a Philippine economist, who can perhaps claim to have coined the word with his book, "Deglobalisation, Ideas for a New World Economy". Britain’s prime minister, Gordon Brown, is among those who fear the results will be bad.

But is globalisation really ending? The world’s economies are certainly slowing fast. And the speed and scale of this recession are raising doubts about the assumptions that had underpinned the drive to integrate world markets. At the end of 2008 the IMF said the world economy would grow 2.2% in 2009, less than half the rate in 2007. Now it thinks growth will be just 0.5% this year, the lowest for 60 years. Even that may be optimistic; in the last quarter of 2008, some economies shrank at annualised rates of over 10%.

Nobody ever said globalisation had ended economic ups and downs, but this feels different: prima facie evidence of big problems at least, and possibly of the failure of globalisation to deliver many of its advertised benefits, especially to the poor. True, economic slowdown is not the same as deglobalisation. And the slowdown has yet to affect one thing. For years, poor countries have been growing faster than rich ones; so far, they still are. The gap between real GDP growth in emerging markets and in rich countries widened from nothing in 1991 to about five points in 2007—

and, says the IMF, it will stay at 5.3 points in 2008 and 2009. Helping poorer countries catch up has long been among the benefits touted for globalisation.

And yet the process is going into reverse. Globalisation means the global integration of the movement of goods, capital and jobs. Each of these processes is now in trouble. World trade has plunged. As recently as the first half of 2008, boosted by rising commodity prices and a falling dollar, trade was growing at an annualised 20% in dollar terms. In the second half of 2008, as commodities sagged and the dollar rose, growth slowed fast; by September, says the IMF, it was in reverse. In December, says the International Air Transport Association, air-cargo traffic (responsible for over a third of the value of the world’s traded goods) was down 23% on December 2007—almost double the fall in the year up to the end of September 2001, a result affected by the 9/11 terror attacks.

The downturn has been sharpest in countries that opened up most to world trade, especially East Asia’s tigers. Singapore’s exports are 186% of GDP; its economy shrank at an annualised rate of 17% in the last three months of 2008. Taiwan’s exports are over 60% of GDP; and its economy may fall as much as 11% this year. The downturn has also hurt rich countries that specialise in staid old-fashioned manufacturing—supposedly a safer activity than the reckless delusions of finance. On average, says the IMF, rich countries will contract 2% this year. But Germany and Japan, big exporters of capital goods, cars and electronics, will do worse, their economies shrinking by 2.5% and 2.6% respectively. In the last quarter their economies contracted alarmingly, falling at an annualised rate of 8% in Germany and by 13%—the worst since 1974—in Japan.

Small countries which went into businesses that grew in globalisation’s wake, like tourism, are also suffering. The World Tourism Organisation says international tourist arrivals fell 1% in the second half of 2008, which may not sound bad, but compares with growth of more than 5% a year for the previous four years. In the Caribbean, visitors may fall by a third this season; in some islands hotels are half empty, flights are being cancelled and national budgets, reliant on tourism, are strained.

In contrast, the biggest emerging markets are doing less badly so far. In India, where exports are around 15% of GDP, the government recently said growth in the year to April 2009 would be 7.1%; most forecasters put growth for the 2009 calendar year lower, but still about 5%. In Brazil the economy has been harder hit by falling commodity prices and declining exports. Most economists still think output grew a bit in the year to the fourth quarter, and put growth for 2009 at 1.5% to 2%. China was still growing by 6.8% in the year to the fourth quarter, though like Brazil it is probably stagnating. Chinese exports fell 18% and imports 43% in the year to January. All three countries have large domestic markets and relatively stable banking systems, which have not been liberalised.

The gap between toothless tigers and friskier BICs (ie, BRICs minus Russia, a special case because of oil) raises questions not so much about globalisation as a whole—after all, Brazil, India and China have been beneficiaries—as about particular aspects. Can one be too dependent on trade? How far should one liberalise banking? Is there a trade-off between taking advantage of good times and providing shock absorbers for bad ones?

Emerging markets’ trade problems have been worsened by shifts in capital flows, globalisation’s second big plank. According to the World Bank, net private debt and equity flows to developing countries will fall from $1 trillion in 2007 to $530 billion in 2009, or from 7.7% to 3% of those countries’ GDPs. The Institute for International Finance sees an even steeper fall; it says that this year banks will extract more from emerging markets in debt repayments than they inject in new loans. Bond markets in those countries collapsed in the last quarter of 2008, doing less than $5 billion of business; in the second quarter, they had issued about $50 billion of bonds.

As with trade, financial deglobalisation is hitting countries in a variety of ways. In this case, East Asia has been less affected because most countries there are net creditors. But eastern Europe and Russia have been hammered because local banks went on a foreign-borrowing binge, foreign banks piled into their markets (and piled out again) and because some countries lacked insurance policies against tough times. Although many big emerging markets have built up foreign-exchange reserves and cut their external debts, in eastern Europe reserves have been flat, external debts have risen and current- account deficits have grown considerably in the past decade. In these countries, the reversal of globalisation has exacerbated problems that were building up anyway.

People in emerging markets have mixed feelings about financial liberalisation and may not regret its reversal. But foreign direct investment (FDI) is different. Most people welcome new factories and new jobs. FDI is also one of the commonest routes by which skills and technology are transferred from rich to poor countries.

This, too, is falling. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) says worldwide FDI inflows shrank 21% in 2008 to $1.4 trillion. The World Association of Investment Promotion Agencies says FDI will contract by a further 12-15% this year.

In contrast to trade, the investment impact of the global downturn has so far been hardest on the countries where the woes began: rich ones. They have seen FDI falls of one-third on average and by half or more in Britain, Italy and Germany. Finland and Ireland have seen net outflows. FDI flows to developing countries were still growing in 2008, albeit by only 4%, after a rise of 21% in 2007. Flows to big South American countries were up by about a fifth; those to India more than doubled, though they may ebb as GDP falters.

The third of the three main aspects of globalisation—jobs—is following the other two, with a lag. The International Labour Organisation forecasts that unemployment worldwide will rise by around 30m above 2007’s level in 2009. Most of that rise will be the result of recession, not deglobalisation, but some will be attributable to the fall in trade (exporting companies will lay off workers) and some to declining investment (if expansion plans are cut, new jobs will not be created).

Deglobalisation will have a dire impact on migrants. In the past decade, more people have been moving voluntarily than ever before; now, some are going home. Those who provided labour for the housing boom in America (notably Latinos), Ireland (Poles) and China (rural Chinese going to cities on the eastern seaboard) have been among the first to be laid off. In Spain newly jobless builders are competing with migrants there for jobs picking fruit.

This will surely have an effect on the flow of remittances from rich countries to poor ones, although it has so far (see article) been quite resilient. In any case, economies that absorbed large numbers of foreign workers may take fewer. Some of the millions of South Asians who work in the Gulf, or the young Africans who flock to South Africa, or the Central Asians who work in Russia, may have to stay at home.

Yet for all the economic pain, the social and political fallout from deglobalisation has not yet been severe. Protests may still come. Or maybe national governments are absorbing most of the ire. In December, Greece saw riots after a police bullet killed a teenager. In France, unions brought over 1m people onto the streets for a one-day strike, and a riot in Latvia over economic policy ended in more than 100 arrests. But only in Britain, where workers have picketed refineries and power stations over the hiring of foreigners, has protest had a very anti-global tone.

This lag may be explained by residual support for globalisation, especially in emerging markets. A poll in 2007 by the Pew Global Attitudes Project found that majorities in 47 countries saw international trade as good for them; majorities in 41 out of 46 welcomed multinational firms; in 39 out of 47, most felt better off with a free market. In more than half the countries where changes could be tracked, support for free markets was rising.

When consensus wobbles

But is that still true? Last summer, on the eve of the meltdown, European Union pollsters reported that two-thirds of EU citizens saw globalisation as profitable only for large firms, not citizens. In 2002, according to the Pew poll, 78% of Americans thought foreign trade helped the country; by 2007 it was only 59%. A CNN poll in July 2008 showed that, for the first time, a small majority of Americans saw trade as a threat, not an opportunity.

Of the few worldwide polls to have been completed since then, one by Edelman for the World Economic Forum found that 62% of respondents in 20 countries said they trusted companies less or a lot less now. Manifestly, popular opinion backs more state regulation.

So far, this has mostly taken the form of pouring public money into banks and selected industries, notably cars. Last week Barack Obama set out plans for another vast bank rescue, and the French government promised €6 billion ($7.8 billion) in preferential loans to Renault and Peugeot-Citroën in return for pledges that no car factories would be closed in France.

There has been somewhat less evidence of trade protectionism. India has raised some steel tariffs. The EU has reintroduced export subsidies for some dairy products. Russia has raised import duties on vehicles. But there has also been movement the other way. The American Senate softened the "Buy America" provisions of the stimulus bill. Mexico said that by 2012 it would cut tariffs on thousands of kinds of manufacture. And some countries have sought a safe harbour, rather than embracing pure nationalism. East Europeans are even keener on the shelter of the euro; Iceland has applied to the EU; the Irish are more likely than they were to vote for the EU’s Lisbon treaty.

Despite the downturn, the nations of the world have not shunned globalisation. It has been protected by the belief of firms in the efficiency of global supply chains. But like any chain, these are only as strong as their weakest link. A danger point will come if firms decide that this way of organising production has had its day.

1. Fiscal policy attempts to affect the level of overall spendingin the economy by changes in:
A) the interest rate.
B) the money supply.
C) banking regulations.
D) taxes and spending.


2. Economists have identified several consecutive months of fallingemployment and forecasts for the next few months are for more ofthe same. At what point in the business cycle is the economyapparently located?
A) recession
B) expansion
C) business cycle peak
D) business cycle trough


3. The onset of the Great Depression:
A) was not a shock to anyone since most economists predicted the“roaring 20s” were bound to end in disaster.
B) created a disagreement between the Hoover administration andconventional economists because Hoover wanted the government tointervene much more quickly than most others.
C) came as a considerable shock to the conventional wisdom ofeconomics at that time and opened the door for critiques ofmainstream thought by economists like JM Keynes.
D) was in 1918 at the end of World War I.


4. When economists measure economic growth, they often use:
A) the inflation rate.
B) the unemployment rate.
C) nominal GDP.
D) real GDP.


5. In a typical business cycle, the business cycle peak isimmediately followed by the:
A) recession.
B) business cycle trough.
C) expansion.
D) depression.


6. Suppose an economy experiences rising total output accompaniedby increasing employment, this is generally known as:
A) stagflation.
B) recession.
C) inflation.
D) expansion.


7. Controlling interest rates is an example of:
A) fiscal policy.
B) tax policy.
C) monetary policy.
D) exchange rate policy.


8. The alternation between recessions and expansions is known asthe:
A) unemployment rate.
B) long-run economic growth.
C) business cycle.
D) macroeconomy.


9. A recession in America is typically associated with:
A) a falling unemployment rate.
B) a decrease in the number of people living in poverty.
C) a decrease in the percentage of Americans with healthinsurance.
D) an increase in corporate profits.


10. The purpose of macroeconomic policy is to:
A) bring unemployment closer to the natural rate.
B) reduce the severity of recessions.
C) rein in excessively strong expansions.
D) bring unemployment closer to the natural rate and to reduce theseverity of recessions.


11. The trade balance is the difference between the value ofthe:
A) trade deficit and the budget deficit.
B) goods and services that one country sells to other countries andthe value of the goods and services it buys in return.
C) exchange rates of two countries that are engaged ininternational trade.
D) national debt and the foreign debt.


12. Increasing the total amount of available productive resourcesis the focus of __________.
A) macroeconomics
B) fiscal policy
C) monetary policy
D) microeconomics


13. The point on a business cycle when real GDP stops rising andbegins falling is a(n):
A) peak.
B) trough.
C) expansion.
D) recession.


14. During a recession, one will often observe:
A) aggregate output rising.
B) unemployment rates will be increasing while aggregate output isfalling.
C) employment rates will be rising.
D) zero unemployment rates.


15. Monetary policy involves:
A) changes in government spending.
B) changes in government tax receipts.
C) changes in the quantity of money.
D) changes in tax rates.


16. The trough of the business cycle:
A) comes right after the expansion phase.
B) comes before the recession phase.
C) is a temporary maximum level of real GDP.
D) is a temporary minimum level of real GDP.


17. Which one of the following statements about the U.S. economy isnot accurate?
A) Since the Second World War, aggregate output grew at a ratelower than the average annual growth rate of population.
B) Since the Second World War, aggregate output grew at a ratehigher than the average annual growth rate of population.
C) Since the Second World War, macroeconomic policy has helped makethe economy more stable.
D) Long-run growth per capita is the key to higher wages and arising standard of living.


18. An economic recovery is all of the following except:
A) economic growth of a sustained nature.
B) a short-run increase in aggregate production in aneconomy.
C) a time of increasing employment.
D) the end of the business cycle.


19. Which of the following would NOT be classified as amacroeconomic question?
A) How many people are employed in the economy as a whole?
B) What determines the overall level of prices in the economy as awhole?
C) What determines the overall trade in goods, services, andfinancial assets between the United States and the rest of theworld?
D) What determines the cost to a university or college of offeringa new course?


20. Which of the following statements regarding price level orinflation is correct?
A) Supply and demand can not explain why a particular good orservice becomes more expensive relative to other goods andservices.
B) Inflation affects only the more advanced countries whereas lessadvanced countries face deflation.
C) Prices of most goods and services remained stable during thegreat depression.
D) In general, when the economy is in recession and jobs are hardto find, inflation tends to fall.


21. If wages grew at a 5% rate last year and average prices grew ata 3% rate, then the average worker is:
A) better off.
B) worse off.
C) no better or worse off.
D) unaffected.


22. In an open economy:
A) the exchange rate is determined by the government.
B) specialization in activities with a comparative advantage is notpossible.
C) trade is only beneficial to the relatively larger economy.
D) there is trade in goods, services, or assets with othercountries.


23. Changes in government spending and taxes in an effort to changeoverall spending in an economy is:
A) fiscal policy.
B) monetary policy.
C) investment.
D) the stock market.


24. If an economy is open, this means that:
A) anyone can immigrate to the country.
B) trading with other countries makes up a portion of itseconomy.
C) it does not trade with other countries.
D) it will experience a drop in its real GDP.


25. Inflation is a situation where:
A) the average price level falls.
B) the average price level increases.
C) the average price level becomes negative.
D) the real price level falls.


26. The topics studied in macroeconomics include:
A) the price of a motorcycle.
B) the wages of engineers.
C) the average price level in the economy.
D) how much ice cream consumers buy.


27. A period of rising real GDP is a(n):
A) peak.
B) trough.
C) expansion.
D) recession.


28. The modern tools of macroeconomic policy are:
A) tax policy and antitrust policy.
B) fiscal policy and monetary policy.
C) monetary policy and exchange rate policy.
D) capital policy and labor policy.


29. A “rubber necking” traffic jam is an example of:
A) microeconomics in action.
B) individual behavior that has a large aggregate impact.
C) the paradox of thrift.
D) an outcome smaller than the sum of its parts.


30. The most painful consequence of a recession is:
A) rising unemployment.
B) increasing inflation.
C) increasing aggregate output.
D) higher interest rates.


31. Per capita economic growth is:
A) economic growth per unit of capital.
B) economic growth per person.
C) economic expansion over the business cycle.
D) sustained increase in aggregate output.


32. Keynesian economics stressed:
A) total spending.
B) the self-regulating power of free markets.
C) the long run.
D) that the Depression should run its course to bring down the highcost of living.


33. When an economy's overall production grows faster than itspopulation, this is referred to as:
A) long-run growth per capita.
B) an increase in nominal GDP.
C) deflation.
D) the paradox of thrift.


34. Fiscal policy attempts to affect the overall level of spendingin the economy through:
A) changes in the inflation rate.
B) changes in the quantity of money or the interest rate.
C) changes in tax policy or government spending.
D) discretionary regulation of profits and wages.


35. With regard to the aggregate price level, economists generallybelieve:
A) price stability is a desirable goal.
B) inflation is worse than deflation.
C) deflation is worse than inflation.
D) inflation actually benefits most retired people.


36. Recessions are periods when:
A) output rises.
B) the aggregate price level rises.
C) the unemployment rate is falling.
D) output and employment are falling.


37. Monetary policy attempts to affect the overall level ofspending in the economy by changes in:
A) taxes.
B) taxes and spending.
C) taxes and interest rates.
D) interest rates and the quantity of money.


38. The basic difference between an economic recession and economicdepression is that:
A) the latter is a shorter economic downturn than the former.
B) during recessions output falls faster than duringdepressions.
C) during depressions employment falls faster than duringrecessions.
D) the former is a longer economic downturn than the latter.


39. The central mission of modern macroeconomics is to prevent_____ from happening again.
A) recessions
B) inflation
C) deflation
D) anything like the Great Depression


40. Fiscal policy refers to:
A) the control of interest rates.
B) the control of government spending and taxations.
C) the control of the quantity of money.
D) the control of interest rates and of government spending.


Hello, could you please assist with this discussion question for the Economics course? Thank you.

5) Go to the internet and find an article that discusses the problems of income inequality in the U.S. economy, summarize key points, and post in the Discussions area.

http://neweconomics.org/2014/12/why-inequality-is-an-economic-problem/

Why Inequality Is An Economic Problem

Rising economic inequality was a major driver of the financial crisis. With the OECD recently debunking ‘trickle-down’ economics, our new report sets out the links between inequality, the growth in scale and influence of the financial sector, and the dangers for financial stability.

A fragile recovery

A return to growth in economies such as the UK and USA has been welcomed as a sign of recovery from the 2008 financial crisis. But as GDP picks up, so too has the widening gap between rich and poor.

The crisis may be over for the wealthy but the aftermath for ordinary workers depressed wages and growing debt is only getting worse.

Most nations have mustered only negligible growth and this has failed to benefit the vast majority of those nation's populations.

In the seven years following the crash, the UK has suffered the longest sustained decline in real wages since records began.

This decline hasn't has been shared equally across the income spectrum latest annual data up to the end of 2013 shows real earnings for the top 10% increasing by 3.9% and a 2.4% fall for the remaining 90%.

Households are once again piling on risky personal debt at a rate of almost $1billion a year.

Globally, wealth grew by 8.3% last year to $263 trillion, even as living standards stagnate for the majority. Income inequality has seen a sharp return the top 1% of earners have reaped 95% of the USA's economic gains since the crash.

Inequality increases as economies are financialised

Over the past four decades, financial sectors have been extensively deregulated and have expanded enormously as a result, particularly in the UK and USA.

This deregulation produced two systemic outcomes: finance has been freed to become the motor of the economy while the pursuit of greater equality of citizens, as was the focus after the second world war, has been abandoned.

Instead, the notion that unrestrained pursuit of wealth would trickle-down from rich to the poor has been embraced in the mainstream political and economic arenas.

Financial markets, products, and firms now play a much larger role in many areas; from pensions and social insurance to homes and public infrastructure.

Privatization and the doctrine of maximizing value for shareholders have increased the amount of economic activity focused on extracting the largest possible short-term profit. These trends are referred to collectively as ‘financialisation’.

Until now the connections between this increasing prevalence of financial activities and the steady increase in economic inequality have not been clear. But when these two trends reached a boiling point in the mid-2000s they fuelled a global collapse of financial systems.

The polarization of wealth and incomes fed asset bubbles, risky financial activity,, and necessitated vast levels of household debt – resulting in the 2008 financial crash. With little done since to address these interconnected drivers, the threat of another crisis is very real.

This diagram lays out the seven indicators of economic instability, each fuelled by rising inequality and increasing financial sector activity:

Our report describes how these indicators laid the path for the 2008 crash, and threaten to do the same again:

Increasing inequality depresses demand since consumption levels depend more on the wages of those at the lower end of the income scale than the profits of the wealthy

In the face of stagnating wages, households rely increasingly on debt to maintain their lifestyles with rising asset prices, especially in residential housing, worsening this.

Financial liberalization allows money to flood into countries with trade deficits, such as the USA and the UK, providing the funds for debt-led consumption.

Snowballing wealth at the top increases risky financial speculation.

Inequality doesn't bring growth, it brings economic instability

In recent years there has been a marked slowing of growth across the world's wealthiest economies, with none returning to the growth trends experienced before the crisis. Many have begun to speculate that this stagnation could, in fact, be a permanent development meaning that wealthy economies are fundamentally unable to create enough demand to keep growing.

The mainstream political consensus has for decades now suggested that inequality is a price worth paying for economic growth.

But new research from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) shows definitively that this inequality/growth trade-off is false adding to a growing body of research showing that inequality actually prevents economies from growing. This points to a fundamental structural flaw in the economy: if the proceeds of growth are not shared, the pie stops growing.

The pursuit of higher returns for the already wealthy within this dwindling pie cannot persist forever. With wealth refusing year on year to trickle down, debt has been used to plug the wage-consumption gap for the rest.

The signals are showing quite plainly that this pursuit of growth, via inequality, is ineffective and unsustainable.

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