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Department
Psychology
Course
PSYC 213
Professor
Jelena Ristic
Semester
Winter

Description
Psychology 213 Review 25/04/2012 17:52:00 ← Chapter 1 ← high-level processing is dependent on lower-level processing ← rationalism: Plato’s theory of arriving at the truth through rational thought and logic, important in theory development ← empiricism: Aristotle’s theory of arriving at the truth through observation, and experimentation, important for the scientific method ← structuralism: Wundt’s theory that the best way to study the mind is through studying perception and through introspection ← functionalism: William James’s theory that placed a focus on the functions that the brain carries out by any method that’s effective ← associationism: synthesis of structuralism and functionalism, study the association of events and how that association leads to learning ← behaviorism: all behavior can be attributed to associations between behavior and/or object and reward, also called the law of effect ← all communication can be broken down into three parts: sender, communication channel, and receiver ← information theory: the less likely a message is, the more information it transmits • e.g. saying “I’m terrible” transmits more information than “I’m good” in response to “how are you?” bit: the amount of information transmitted by an event, defined as the amount of questions necessary to reach an answer the more possible responses, the longer the response time, because the more information each signal transmits there’s a limit to the amount of information a sensory system can process at a time the interference between two stimuli is defined by the amount of information they transmit and the overlap between the kind of processing that they depend on Broadbent’s Filter model: attentional processing works in the model of a channel with a filter that selects for certain features and allows them through to attention Waugh and Norman’s Model of Information-Processing: stimuli go into primary memory automatically, but are only committed to secondary memory if they’re rehearsed Brown-Peterson task: a task requiring participants to recall stimuli after some kind of interference preventing rehearsal • decay of memory increases with interfering stimuli ← ecological approach: approach that tries to approximate real-life conditions ← affordances: what objects imply/afford ← information pickup: the process of learning what different parts of our environment afford ← schema: a means of cognitively exploring the world through our expectations based on previous experience • can have schemas for people (including the self) as well as for objects, person schemas help to interpret behavior ← perceptual cycle: Neisser’s paradigm of schema development, whereby exploration of environment through a schema, which provides further information that can then affect the schema ← cognitive ethology: studies carried out in the real world to complement laboratory studies, based on evidence that cognitive processes change based on the situation and setting (and therefore will be different in a lab than in real life) ← pattern classification: a means of studying behavior by observing its coincidence with patterns of neuroimaging ← ← Chapter 2 ← phrenology: idea that bumps on the skull revealed peoples’ personality traits by revealing the parts of their brains that were more developed than others, disproved, but served as a precedent for the idea of localization of brain functions ← law of mass action: destruction of function after a lesion depends not on the individual cells lesioned but rather the amount of brain tissue lesioned ← law of equipotentiality: while certain functions might be specialized, pretty much any part of the brain can function as any other part of the brain ← interactionism: Descartes’s theory that the mind and brain exist separately but interact, specifically at the pineal gland ← epiphenomenalism: the mind is a byproduct of the brain’s functioning, and has no impact on behavior ← parallelism: the mind and the brain are two parallel aspects of the same reality, where anything that happens to one happens at the same time to the other ← isomorphism: any event of the mind (experience) and event of the brain (neural patterns) take the same shape • e.g. for the Necker cube, our altered perception of it is coupled with altered brain processing patterns ← based on the results of his studies of split brain patients and animals, Sperry hypothesized that consciousness was an emergent property of the brain, meaning that it can’t be reducible to individual brain functions • with the emergence of consciousness, consciousness can enact emergent causation on lower-level brain functions • the mind is supervenient, meaning that it has the capacity for top- down influence despite having emerged from the processes that it is influencing ← connectionism: the theory that cognitive processes emerge from a large number of interconnected neurons, which then form neural networks, and changes in neural processing (like learning) come from changes in the strength of the connections of these neural networks, which then affects behavior • assumes parallel processing, the idea that many neural connections can be active at once, in contrast to serial processing, which is the theory that only one connection is active at a time ← Hebb rule: when a neuron is repeatedly involved in causing another neuron to fire, the connection between those two neurons is strengthened ← single dissociation: damage to the temporal lobe causes damage to memory but not planning ← double dissociation: damage to the temporal lobe causes damage to memory but not planning, and damage to the frontal lobe causes damage to planning but not memory ← the caveat in neuroimaging studies is that they always show a correlational but not necessarily causational link between brain processes and behavior ← chronometric measures: behavioral measures of performance like reaction time and accuracy on a task ← necessary to study behavior as well as brain function because just because a subject seems to be attending to a task (and therefore that their brain function is a reaction to it) doesn’t necessarily mean that they are ← ← Chapter 3 ← our perception of vision comes from the brain, constructed around the light information received from the retina, the eyes aren’t necessary for seeing • auras with migraines, imagining things we’ve never seen ← associative agnosia: a visual agnosia in which patients can copy images but are incapable of recognizing them ← optic ataxia: incapacity to reach for objects despite being able to perceive them normally, due to damage in the dorsal visual stream ← optic apraxia: problems with smooth pursuit and initiating saccades ← time spaces: a phenomenon in which some people see a representation of time (in months, weeks, hours, etc.) as existing in the physical world surrounding them ← theory of ecological optics: Gibson’s theory that the information received by sensory organs is directly used to guide behavior in our environments ← ambient optical array (AOA): Gibson’s term for the patterns of light that we see in our environment at any given time that give rise to visual perception, transforms as we move ← topological breakage: discontinuity that results from the meeting of two different texture gradients ← optic flow: the pattern of constant transformation of the AOA that results when an observer moves through their environment ← Gibson wasn’t interested in illusions, but a more ecological approach, by studying our perceptions in normal real-world situations of visual perception ← pattern recognition: the recognition of an individual instance or object as part of a larger pattern (e.g. seeing a coffee cup and recognizing it as belonging to the schema of coffee cups) ← percept: categorization of a certain type of object, formed by the experience of those objects creating a memory trace ← Hoffding function: the meeting of an emerging perception and a memory trace, which leads to recognition ← template-matching theory: the theory that we have a template of known objects in our minds (specific objects or prototypes can both serve as templates), and recognition depends on the matching of that template to a particular instance of perception ← multiple-trace memory model: Hintzman’s theory that each perceptual experience causes a memory trace • experience is thought to initiate a probe into secondary memory, where it is matched to similar memory traces and then returns an echo to primary memory • experiment: subjects were shown distorted versions of a prototype, and were able to classify the original prototypes well when they saw them, and mistakenly thought they’d seen it before o Hintzman said that the distorted prototypes created an echo that contained everything the prototypes had in common, which was then recalled by the probe when shown the non- distorted prototype ← pandemonium: a version of feature detection theory consisting of three levels • features: aspects of an object like color, shape, and size • cognitive demons: specialized processes the selectively detect features of the object • decision demon: selects for the “demon” that is responding most, determining which pattern is recognized ← contrast energy: determined by the degree of contrast between an object and its background ← squelching: blocking of processing by the visual system when there’s not enough information for feature processing, can occur if the contrast energy isn’t high enough ← recognition by components (RBC): the theory that every object can be reduced to combinations of 36 geons • recognition gets better with the inclusion of more geons (and therefore more detail) • recoverability of geons refers to how easy they are to make out • the template of an image would include most of the usual angles from which we would see it ← context effects: the restricting effect of context on the interpretation of perceptual information • demonstrated by the jumbled word effect • word superiority effect: finding that it’s easier to recognize a letter in a word than in a non-word or alone ← parallel distributed processing (PDP): processing occurs through the interactions of units sending excitatory and inhibitory signals to one another • when recognizing a word, knowing that the first letter is a consonant inhibits the likelihood of recognizing the second letter as also being a consonant and thereby facilitates recognition of the word as a whole ← empirical theory of color vision: the theory that perception of color depends on the processing of the wavelengths of light, but is also affected by previous experience of color perception and the effect of different lighting on perception, etc. ← cross-modal context: context provided by information from other sensory modalities, the McGurk effect demonstrates this ← change blindness: our failure to notice change if we’re not explicitly attending to the object or area that’s undergoing the change • doesn’t occur if we’re able to perceive the change as movement, because our visual system is attuned very highly to recognize movement ← feature integration theory (FIT): Anne Treisman’s theory that we perceive objects by parsing out their individual features and then binding them together • pre-attentive processing: occurs for features like color and shape (as well as for meaningful words) that we process unconsciously and without necessarily attending to them • feature binding only occurs at the level of attentive processing, which is conscious, and involves binding together two or more pre- attentive features ← bi-stable figures: figures like the Necker cube that can be perceived in two different but equally stable ways ← Gestalt theory postulates that perception is holistic and emerges from our grouping of the elements of an object according to certain organizational principles • principle of emergence: perceptions arise as a whole, not parts (i.e. Necker cube) • principle of reification: perceptions of an object can contain more information than the object itself (i.e. illusory figures) • principle of invariance: we recognize simple shapes regardless of size, orientation, color, etc. • principle of experience: grouping based on our previous experiences with similar objects • figure-ground segmentation: distinguishing between what makes up the background of an image and what the object/focus is o Gibson thought that we did this according to the denotivity of each part of an image, which is its relative meaningfulness/recognizableness • principle of proximity: grouping based on objects’ physical proximity to one another • principle of closure: grouping based on forming a closed object • principle of good continuation: grouping objects to form smooth, continuous lines or curves • principle of similarity: grouping based on the similarity of two or more objects • principle of common fate: grouping based on objects moving in the same direction or fashion • however, processing of particular elements of an image can sometimes override the overall perception of the image, which suggests that Gestalist principles don’t apply to all perception congenital prosopagnosia: face blindness or deficiency in recognition of faces resulting not from brain damage but from a congenital defect, and despite the fusiform face area functioning normally, suggesting that it is due to a problem with connections to the area rather than a problem with the area itself, shows that prosopagnosia seems to exist more on a spectrum than in the all- or-none fashion of brain damage that we previously believed it to be Chapter 4 shadowing task: dichotic listening task in which the participant has to repeat the message from one ear, shows that we have a filter to selectively attend to certain information early selection theory: attention can prevent the processing of irrelevant information in the early stages of processing late selection theory: all information is processed, and attention relies on people actively ignoring that which is irrelevant automatic process: process that happens whether or not we pay attention to executing it controlled process: process that requires the devotion of attention to execute activation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate cortex are involved in selecting relevant information from a group attention capture: a stimulus that grabs attention involuntarily inattentional blindness: the failure to notice something that otherwise should’ve been attended to because attention is elsewhere spotlight metaphor for attention: Posner’s idea that attention is like a spotlight of fixed size, where we attend to exclusively what’s illuminated by the metaphorical spotlight zoom lens metaphor for attention: Eriksen’s idea that attention is like a zoom lens where we zoom in selectively on certain parts of visual percepts while effectively ignoring all others, and when we zoom out, it expands our attentional field while decreasing the amount of processing that can be allocated to each item gradient metaphor for attention: LaBerge’s idea that there’s a gradation of attention where what’s in the center of our attention is in sharp resolution and everything around it is allocated gradated degrees of processing, which decrease with the distance from the center despite the fact that these theories imply selection of attention based on space, evidence (i.e. the gorilla video) indicate that we can also select for objects flanker task: people had to search for someone’s name while a face (either that of the searched person or not) was displayed in the periphery, people couldn’t ignore the face even when it was incongruous and therefore increased response time • face processing seems to be an instance of attention capture ← capacity model: the model of attention that postulates that we have limited attentional resources, and that performance on a given task is a direct result of how much attention we have available to dedicate to it ← structural limits: the theory that we have attentional capacity for certain kinds of tasks, and that similar tasks will interfere more with each other because they draw on the same capacity ← attending to something increases the processing of that thing while decreasing processing of all other things ← central bottleneck: the theory that we have a filter through which information relevant to only one task at a time can pass • unclear whether this filter acts before or after perceptual processing of information, some evidence (like the cocktail party phenomenon: our attention can be grabbed by someone saying our name) suggests that it happens after processing, because clearly at least some information is being processed and ignored if the attention- grabbing stimulus is also processed ← divided attention: the theory that we are capable of dividing our attention between two tasks simultaneously ← set: top-down organization of cognitive processes that facilitates attention in one area while inhibiting it in other areas ← attentional set: a temporary organization of cognitive processes that facilitates responses when attending to a particular task ← task switching: switch between carrying out two different tasks, exacts a switch cost, which is a dip in the performance level on the task, occurs whether or not the switch was voluntary ← additive factors logic: if we’re capable of performing two tasks simultaneously without interference, then they draw on different attentional resources ← interacting factors logic: if we’re incapable of performing two tasks simultaneously without interference, then they draw on the same attentional resources ← backward masking: the experimental procedure of presenting a stimulus and then masking it with another stimulus, allows study of the priming effect of the original stimulus • stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA): time period between the presentation of the stimulus and its masking cuing task: task developed by Posner where the subject’s attention is cued somewhere or to something and then the stimulus is presented either where the attention was cued (valid target) or elsewhere (invalid) • for reflexive attention (subject is told that the cue only predicts the target at a chance level): if the SOA is between 0 and 1 seconds, the reaction time is faster if the target is valid, and if it’s longer, the reaction time is slower if the target is valid, because attention will abandon the cued area or object and not return to it until all other objects or areas have been inspected, called inhibiting orienting response (IOR) • for volitional attention (subject is told that the cue predicts the target at a level higher than chance): no attentional effect at SOAs less than 1 second because volitional attention isn’t yet engaged (should be effect of reflexive attention but not included in models) but no IOR effect at longer SOAs (i.e. cuing facilitates target identification on valid trials) ← dissociation paradigm: strategy that relies on the presumption that it’s possible to process stimuli without being consciously aware of it ← objective threshold: the threshold at which a stimulus is no longer being processed and the subject’s response can be assessed through indirect measures as being at chance level, lower than the subjective threshold ← subjective threshold: the level at which the subject reports to not have perceived the stimulus ← process dissociation procedure: a research paradigm in which stimuli are shown and then the subject is asked not to respond with the stimulus they were just shown, once the SOA was below the subjective threshold, the subjects were more likely to respond with the stimulus, showing that they had unconsciously perceived it but didn’t have the conscious control to not provide it as a response ← rapid stream visual presentation (RSVP): an experimental method that studies the temporal constraints of attention, revealed the phenomenon of attentional blink ← attentional blink: the lack of processing of a stimulus when it’s presented within 550 millisceonds after another one, thought to be because the first stimulus is still being processed, more likely to occur if the first stimulus was extensively attended to ← attention is constrained by the physical limitations of our bodies ← hemispatial neglect: neglect of the contralesional space due to damage to the parietal lobe (almost always the right parietal lobe), also causes sluggishness to use contralesional limbs, anytime there’s competition for attention between the two halves of attentional space, the contralesional space is always neglected, but if stimuli are presented separately to each half of space, attention and processing are normal ← Balint’s syndrome: bilateral parietal damage resulting in simultagnosia and optic ataxia and apraxia ← sequential attention hypothesis: the hypothesis that overt attentional shifts follow covert attentional shifts ← physiological nystagmus: the minute movements of the eyes that are constantly occurring, small movements indicate fixation while large movements indicate saccades ← moving window technique: the technique of obscuring a text except for the area where the person is focusing, has no affect on reading as long as the person can see between 17 and 20 characters at a time ← entry point: the place in a text where a person begins reading, often a heading or picture in newspapers ← saccadic movements aren’t random, but seem to center around the most relevant information ← task-related knowledge: knowledge about the task at hand that guides the eye’s exploration of an image or scene ← reflexive attention is faster but shorter-lasting, whereas volitional attention is slower but longer-lasting • reflexive attention can also interrupt volitional attention (i.e. a loud sound • reflexive attention relies on the ventrolateral frontoparietal network, which seems to consist of the medial and inferior front gyri, as well as the tempoparietal junction in the right hemisphere • volitional attention relies on the dorsolateral frontoparietal network, which seems to consist of the superior and inferior parietal lobules as well as the front eye field (which controls voluntary eye movements) bilaterally Yerkes-Dawson law: optimal retrieval of a memory is at a moderate level of emotional arousal, which implies attention to the task at hand without excessive arousal causing anxiety memory suffers with depression, both clinical and temporarily lab- induced • greater the severity of the symptoms the greater the memory impairment • thought to be due to a depletion of attentional resources because they’re tied up in the depression, which leads to a lower degree of attention available to allocate to a task, as well as an unwillingness to do a task unless it seems to be relevant or necessary (which a laboratory task probably won’t) Velten procedure: a means of inducing a mood in a laboratory by having the subject read phrases designed to exemplify a certain mood and asking them to try to identify with them state-dependent memory can apply for mood, context, culture, and roles as well as for drugs, and affects free-recall most • state seems to affect both encoding and retrieval sensory memory: measured in units of seconds, traces are found in sensory cortices • sensory buffer: iconic/echoic memory, iconic memory can last up to a second and echoic memory up to ten seconds, can hold a lot of material but only for a very limited period of time and only sensory material, which hasn’t been semantically processed and therefore isn’t contextualized short-term memory: measured in seconds and minutes, has a limited capacity (about seven items) but is conscious • information can be lost from short-term memory through decay (natural fading) or interference (other information, either retroactive or proactive, interferes with encoding), which causes the information to leave short-term memory earlier than it otherwise would have and to drop off more precipitously working memory: Baddeley’s theory of short-term memory that it exists both to retain and manipulate memories that come both from sensory and long-term memory storage long-term memory: measured in minutes to years, thought at first that memory has to go through short-term memory and be rehearsed in order to be committed to long-term memory (Atikson and Shiffrin), but lesion studies in humans have shown that some kinds of information can go straight from sensory memory to long- term memory ← Chapter 5 ← mystic writing pad: Freud’s metaphor for memory, perceptual experiences leave traces that are overlaid, our experience of memory is the sum of those overlaid traces ← reappearance hypothesis: idea that when we recall a memory we are merely calling the same thing up over and over again ← flashbulb memories: memories of a consequential event (e.g. Kennedy’s assassination) that seem especially vivid and detailed but aren’t actually any more accurate or immune to degradation than normal memories • seem to emerge because they’re the intersection of memories and telling our life story, flashbulb memories represent a memory that also serves as a significant life story event ← Now Print theory: theory that accounts for flashbulb memories, according to which certain memories are recorded in vivid and accurate detail when they’re perceived to be both surprising and especially significant • because they’re surprising and significant, we tend to rehearse them more than other memories, both to ourselves and to other people ← consolidation theory: the theory that memory traces aren’t fully consolidated into memory for some time after the initial experience ← retroactive interference: something that happens after an experience that can affect our recall of it because the memory is still being consolidated • can either be something that interferes directly with the consolidation of the memory by affecting our perception of it, or indirectly just by drawing on mental resources during the consolidation process ← false memories: memories of things that didn’t actually occur, can arise from suggestion after the fact, demonstrated by experiment in which 30% of people said they recalled a plausible but never-occurred event from childhood as well as Loftus’s study where she changed the intensity of the word used to describe a car accident and thereby changed peoples’ perception of the accident ← reconsolidation: changes that can occur to a memory trace after recall based on the conditions under which it was recalled, occurs in the hippocampus ← rationalization: automatic process of making sense of remembered information in a way that’s not always the most faithful to the truth ← it’s possible that body schema is able to change more readily when the change is gradual (i.e. growth over a period of time rather than abrupt loss of a limb) ← schema theories usually see memory as being described most accurately by 4 processes • selection: we select information that’s relevant to our interests at the time (e.g. extract information relevant to a burglar or prospective home buyer depending on which role the subject’s asked to play), doesn’t mean we completely ignore the other information if it later becomes relevant • abstraction: we extract the meaning from an event rather than the absolute details of the event itself, effect of abstraction becomes more powerful as time passes • interpretation: we interpret this meaning based on context at the time and the context of our other memories (e.g. example of the roman numerals on the grandfather clock, interpretation can override sensory information) • integration: we integrate the information into our schema, doesn’t always occur • schemas can make information easier to remember, demonstrated by the experiment with seemingly nonsensical information if the subject wasn’t first provided with a schema ← misinformation effect: the phenomenon by which misleading information after an event can affect our recall of the event itself, often impossible to know where the misleading information came from and it’s therefore attributed to be from the experience itself ← source monitoring framework: a theory that people often fail to adequately monitor the sources of information and can thereby easily be misled about the details of an event ← script: a predetermined set of expectations for a specific experience of situation ← life scripts: culturally-shared and -determined expectations about the scope and timing of a life course, not determined by personal experience as most other scripts are ← primary memory: the initial experience and processing of a perceptual event ← secondary memory: the stored perceptions of events that can be activated by probes and thereby produce an echo of the original perception ← depth of processing: the degree of complexity to which information is processed (e.g. shallow would be processing based on simple features like the font of letters and deep would be processing based on the word’s semantic meaning), the more deeply we process an event the better we remember it ← elaboration: extra processing of a memory that forms connections between it and other memories/information ← distinctiveness: the degree of precision to which a memory is encoded (i.e. “cabbage” is more distinct than “food”) ← general levels of representation: the basic underlying meaning behind information or a memory, is retained even as people age (e.g. who someone is, relationship to you) ← specific levels of representation: more specific and often superficial aspects of memory or information, often lost as people age (e.g. someone’s name) ← the parts of the brain activated when an experience is occurring tend to be the same as those activated in the recall of that experience ← general principles approach to research: laboratory study that focuses on finding the principles underlying experience and behavior ← ecological memory approach to research: study focusing more on real- world observation to lead to practical applications ← forgetting curve: result of Ebbinghaus’s experiments with nonsense syllables, which shows that memory drops off rapidly at first and then plateaus over time • varies with amount of information, depth of processing, and temporal distribution of studying ← Jost’s law of forgetting: if two memory traces are of equal strength, the decay of the younger trace will be faster than that of the older trace, expression of the pattern of the forgetting curve ← Ribot’s law of retrograde amnesia: the fact that for patients with retrograde amnesia due to brain damage, newer memories are more likely to be lost than older memories ← law of progressions and pathologies (last in, first out): the newer a system is, the more quickly it will show degeneration ← permastore: the theory that there’s a relatively permanent store of memory, that at a certain point, memory ceases to decay, or decays at such a slow rate that the memory loss is imperceptible (demonstrated by the studies of people who had studied Spanish), rehearsal after information is learned doesn’t seem to affect its transfer to permastore ← level and length of retention seems to depend much less on aptitude and much more on the method by which the material was learned, more successful retention is associated with learning the material over a relatively extended period of time, and repeated exposure to it afterwards ← ← Chapter 6 ← principle of encoding specificity: if a cue was originally coded with an item, it’s more likely that that cue will facilitate recall ← episodic memory: memory of something that has happened to you, a personal experience, autonoetic because it involves memory of personal experiences ← semantic memory: memory of facts, general knowledge, noetic because it implies consciousness of the current situation as well as of the past and future ← it’s possible for a person to have access to semantic memory without having access to episodic memory ← recency bias: bias to remember something that was most recently experienced ← primacy bias: bias to remember the thing that happened first in a series, due to increased rehearsal ← the middle of the series tends to be remembered least effectively, because it doesn’t have the benefit of the recency bias and rehearsal of the first information interfered with its encoding ← procedural memory: a kind of implicit memory that contains information about how to carry out well-rehearsed procedures (e.g. walking), anoetic because it’s concerned only with the task at hand ← prefrontal leucotomy: procedure that cuts off all connections between the prefrontal lobe and the rest of the brain, greatly decreases autonoetic functioning ← chronesthesia: our subjective experience of our existence in time, thought to be one important distinguishing factor between humans and non- human animals • while birds have been shown to have a conception of time passing in regards to the past, but not necessarily for the future ← butcher-on-the-bus phenomenon: the characteristic of memory that context is often important for memory ← method of opposition: experimental method of presenting subjects with stimuli under either full or divided attention, and then asking them to complete word stems either with a word for the previous list or with anything but words from the previous list, subjects exposed to the words with divided attention complete the word stems with words from the list whether they were asked to or asked to avoid doing so ← perceptual representation system: a kind of implicit memory that consists of a system of representation of events that’s thought to be responsible for priming ← generic recall: recall of words similar to but not exactly the word one’s trying to recall when suffering from tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon ← teachable language comprehender (TLC): computer model of semantic memory that functions by using units (e.g. fish) that are characterized by properties (e.g. scales) and related by pointers (e.g. has), the more connected things are the easier it is to verify relationships ← Moses illusion: peoples’ tendency to respond to corrected versions of otherwise nonsensical questions when the error is close enough to the correct version semantically and phonologically (i.e. How many animals of each kind did Moses take on the ark?) ← spreading activation: the activation of a semantic network and the nodes connected to it, an activated network can be searched more quickly and therefore a response that can be found in a semantic network that’s already active will be faster, explains priming ← inhibitory response: means of recall facilitation by inhibiting certain semantic connections that are irrelevant ← excitatory response: means of recall facilitation by exciting certain semantic connections that are relevant ← involuntary semantic memories: memories that pop into your head for seemingly no reason (e.g. a song), seem to be primed by events that we’re generally unconscious of unless we actively search for them as causes, this mind popping is a form of priming ← fan effect: the more information we have about a concept, the longer it takes to identify specific information related to it ← propositional network: network of information containing both the information itself and relationships between individual units of information ← working memory: Baddeley’s theory of short term memory that encompasses both the temporary storage and the manipulation of information ← phonological loop: the audio/language aspect of working memory, temporarily holds language-related information, based in the auditory cortex ← visuo-spatial sketchpad: the visual aspect of working memory, temporarily holds visual information, based in the striate cortex ← episodic buffer: working memory system that controls the movement of information both to and from episodic long-term memory, coordinates the phonological loop and visuo-spatial sketchpad with long-term memory ← central executive: means by which information is both selected and integrated from different memory systems, associated with conscious experience, based in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex ← fluid systems: systems that manipulate information but are unchanged by it ← crystallized systems: systems that accumulate information ← episodic memory is especially affected by aging, more so than semantic memory ← it’s possible to have a deficit in semantic but not episodic memory (due to brain damage) ← associative deficit hypothesis: thought to be an explanation of memory degradation in older people, deficiency in both creating and maintaining links between information units (e.g. not being able to pair a name with a face), only affects explicit memory ← Korsakoff’s syndrome: a kind of amnesia resulting from brain atrophy because of a thiamine deficiency, thought to be a kind of disconnection syndrome, which means that implicit learning can take place but there’s no awareness of learning having taken place, also characterized by emotionally flatness and an unawareness of any memory deficit ← Alzheimer’s disease: characterized not by retrieval failure but a loss of information that was once there ← prospective memory: memory system that deals with events that will happen in the future ← errorless learning: the most effective way of teaching amnesics new skills by not allowing them to commit errors, which maximizes on their implicit learning skills ← method of vanishing cues: method of removing cues slowly until the amnesic is capable of naming a word when given its definition without any cues, relies on not having to generalize to contexts very disparate from the original context of learning ← cryptomnesia: unintended plagiarism resulting from the failure to recognize something as being familiar ← dissociative memory disorders: can arise when a part of someone’s personality becomes dissociated due to a traumatizing event without any brain damage • psychogenic amnesia: can’t recall personal memories, temporary • psychogenic fugue: psychogenic amnesia with an ensuing flight to live as someone else, the person can’t remember the fugue episode once they recover from the amnesia • dissociative identity disorder: no explicit memory transfer between alters, but implicit memory transfer can occur childhood amnesia: the incapacity to remember events from before a certain age, usually three or four, thought to be due to differing memory schemas in children that could prevent retrieval, as well as encoding by general schemas instead of by individual memories, and possibly the lack of language to organize the information Chapter 7 Paivio’s dual-coding theory: theory that there are two separate systems (verbal and non-verbal) that code events • logogens: units of the verbal coding system, information lying behind our use of a word, relies more on the left hemisphere • imagens: units of the non-verbal coding system, images that represent concepts, relies more on the right hemisphere • concreteness: the degree to which a word refers to a concept that can be experienced through the senses, highly correlated with the degree of imagery associated with a concept • concrete words are coded by the verbal and non-verbal systems, and are therefore easier to learn than abstract words, which are only coded by the verbal system • concrete words are processed differently by the two hemispheres but not preferentially by either (refutes hypothesis that the right hemisphere would show heightened processing of concrete words) • abstract words are processed more by the left hemisphere ← method of loci: a mnemonic device dependent on remembering something by remembering it as being associated with a certain location • thought to function because it organizes otherwise disparate information into meaningful units ← von Restorff effect: phenomenon of an item being more memorable if it’s different from all the other items in a given set • if all the other items are common, a bizarre item will be best remembered, but if all the other items are bizarre, a common item will be best remembered ← humorous items appear to be more memorable than simply weird items in a set of otherwise mundane items, humor in and of itself may have an effect on how memorable something is ← special places theory: theory that putting something in a distinctive/unlikely place will allow the person to remember while not allowing others to guess the place, similar strategy used in creating passwords • not effective: distinctiveness aids memory in remembering individual items, but not in remembering associations between items o e.g. putting valuables in the freezer will be more difficult to remember than putting valuables in a safe, because the distinctiveness is in the association, not in either of the items individually ← chromasthesia: experience of synesthetes of colored hearing • inducer: stimulus that elicits a synaesthetic experience • concurrent: synaesthetic experience itself • synaesthesia can aid memory if the information isn’t presented in a way that confounds the synaesthetic experience, like presenting numbers in colors different from the concurrent colors • theory: synaesthesia evolved because the connections between different sensory modalities in the brain that are normally pruned weren’t pruned normally, and that these sensory modalities then activate one another when they’re activated o a synaesthestic experience can be provoked by a concept as well as a sensory experience, suggests that these connections aren’t necessarily exclusively between sensory processing centers of the brain • weak synaesthetes: most people, capable of appreciating parallels between sensory modalities (e.g. sunlight is judged to be louder than moonlight) without actually having synaesthetic experiences ← imagery seems to activate the same brain areas as actually seeing what we’re imagining, the visual cortex as well as higher cognitive areas • people who are told to imagine flying over their house show eye movements that would correspond to looking at something from above ← imagery seems to rely on a feedforward-feedback loop between the early sensory systems and the cognitive systems • feedback input from the higher cognitive areas allows the lower sensory systems to recreate perceptual experiences, feedforward loop is responsible for normal perception • we usually close our eyes when we imagine, which prevents interference between the two systems because there’s nothing coming through the feedforward loop • the only difference between actual perception and imagined perception is slightly less activation in the visual cortex ← imagery seems to exist separately from visual perception systems, because some patients can draw objects despite not being able to recognize them • possible that LTM input is what’s necessary for imagery, but it’s still unresolved ← icon: representation of a visual stimulus that persists briefly after that visual stimulus has gone away ← eidetic imagery: representation of a visual stimulus that persists for a minute or longer after the stimulus has gone away, reports of details from perceptions of eidetic images allow more rapid and assured than reports from memory, but not more accurate • seems that describing an eidetic image causes it to fade more rapidly • some people have especially clear and long-lasting eidetic images, but seems to exist to a certain extent in everyone ← vividness of visual imagery: measure of the degree of richness of a certain memory, not necessarily correlated with accuracy ← mental rotation: the capacity to mentally rotate an object, evidence suggests that people actually go through the process of rotating the object in their mind, takes about one second to rotate an object 60 • right hemisphere seems to be preferentially engaged for simpler mental rotation tasks, but both hemispheres are engaged for more complex tasks, like mental folding • women tend to be worse at mental rotation, but improved much more than men after training playing video games to the point where there was no discrepancy ← objective distance: the perceived true distance between two objects with respect to their representation on a map • the farther two objects are objectively, the longer it takes to scan from one to the other mentally, we incorporate objective distances into our mental processing ← categorical distance: the number of landmarks that lie between two objects on a map • also a positive correlation between mental scanning time and categorical distance ← images as anticipations: the phenomenon that we will more readily perceive something if we were imagining it already or if the stimulus falls within the area where we were imagining something • in general, we pick up information that we expect better than information that we don’t ← we don’t have the capacity to imagine an ambiguous figure and flip between perceptions of it the way that we do with actual images of ambiguous figures, imagery and perceptions are fundamentally different ← emergent properties of imagery: new properties or interpretations of images can emerge even if they didn’t exist/weren’t perceived during the initial perception of the image or if the imagery is completely invented, suggests that imagery isn’t only one thing, as the ambiguous figure experiment might suggest • analog form of representation: the theory that imagery is not just a mental representation of the relationships between objects, but can give rise to new perceptions of those relationships ← egocentric perspective transformations: imagining one’s movement through space
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