ECO316H1 Chapter 2.8,3.1,3.2: ECO316H1 Chapter 2.8,3.1,3.: ECO316H1 Chapter 2.8,3.1,3: ECO316H1 Chapter 2.8,3.1,: ECO316H1 Chapter 2.8,3.1: ECO316H1 Chapter 2.8,3.: ECO316H1 Chapter 2.8,3: ECO316H1 Chapter 2.8,: ECO316H1 Chapter 2.8: ECO316H1 Chapter 2.: Week 2 Ch 2.8, 3.1, 3.2Cournot and Bertrand Oligopoly—
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Week 2: ch 2. 8, 3. 1, 3. 2cournot and bertrand. General model: n firms produce single good, ci(qi) is increasing cost function of producing qi goods, output is sold at a single price. P(q) is a decreasing function: players: the firms, actions: set of actions in set of possible outputs, preferences: preferences represented by profit. Properties of nash equilibrium: both firms could obtain higher profits through collusions. General model: each firm chooses price, produces enough output to meet demand it faces given the prices chosen by all firms. Assume firm produces to satisfy demand even if price is below unit cost: single good produced by n firms, produce qi units at cost ci(qi, total amount demanded is d(p, consumers purchase from firm with lowest price. If more than one firm sets lowest price, firms share demand equally. Firm whose price isn"t lowest has no demand and therefore no output.