ECO331H1 Chapter Notes - Chapter cooperation and punishment: Public Good, Strategic Dominance, Social Dilemma
Document Summary
Week 10: cooperation and punishment in public goods. People are averse to being "sucker" in social dilemma situations. Those who cooperate may be willing to punish free-riding even if costly for them and even if they cannot expect future benefits from their punishment. Free riders punished the more heavily they deviate from cooperation levels of the cooperators. Potential free riders can reduce punishment by increasing cooperation levels. Without punishment, complete free riding is dominant strategy. With punishment, punishment is costly and purely selfish subjects will never punish in one shot context. If only selfish subjects, treatment with punishment should generate same contribution behavior as treatment without. Stranger and partner treatments with and without punishment. Group composition does not change in partner treatment, randomly changed each period for stranger. Same group do punishment and no punishment for stranger, another group does punishment and no punishment for partner.
