PHIL 415 Lecture Notes - Lecture 17: Cognitive Synonymy, Curve, Tacit Knowledge
12 Jun 2018
School
Department
Course
Professor
Today we’re going to look at Quine’s responses to the two dogmas
In philosophy, it’s rare to have co-authored works
Whereas in science, working together is very common
Grice & Strawson tries to push the burden of proof back to Quine
Quine says, we have this notion that appears to be well understood, until we look at it
closely and see that it’s not well understood
Grice & Strawson say that Quine is “pretending not to know what analyticity is”
It’s all about where you feel the burden of proof lies
The question is, when is it legit to do something like what Quine did: the “closed curve”
Which “closed curves” are a problem and which ones are ok?
Quine has not made his case beyond reasonable doubt
If you’re going to have a push the burden of proof back the other way, you say ‘I’m
innocent so prove me wrong if you think I’m wrong’
To understand the concept is to know how to go on, to use it in unfamiliar situations
EX: You know your kid has mastered a word when they use it spontaneously
Accounting for certain philosophical notions is very hard
If you want to argue that the concept is incoherent, you need more than “there’s no
satisfactory account”
They’re using the presumption of innocence
They don’t use the term “tacit knowledge”
Tacit, doesn’t necessarily mean implicit, but something like that – things that you know
that you don’t even notice that you know
It’s just part of how you do things: non-explicit, non-articulate knowledge
In this case, how to apply distinction
EX: People who aren’t philosophically adept can say whether two words mean two or the
same things
You have to have a really strong argument if you want to say everyone is wrong
It’s possible but very unlikely to argue that everyone is wrong
You have to have a good error theory, a theory for why it appears to be so, but actually
it’s not – it’s just an illusion of agreement
Quine shifts from trivial synonymy to cognitive synonymy
It’s not enough to say that it’s an illusion of philosophers
Maybe an illusion, but not of philosophers
This supposed illusion is shared by everyone
It’s one thing to argue that other philosophers are all wrong, but to argue that everyone is
systematically wrong requires a much stronger argument
Here’s how you know if you have a problem
Quine wants to reject expressions like ‘blank means the same as blank’
On a functional level, translating everyday documents – what does it mean to say that this
is a correct or incorrect translation
find more resources at oneclass.com
find more resources at oneclass.com
Document Summary
Today we"re going to look at quine"s responses to the two dogmas. In philosophy, it"s rare to have co-authored works. Whereas in science, working together is very common. Grice & strawson tries to push the burden of proof back to quine. Quine says, we have this notion that appears to be well understood, until we look at it closely and see that it"s not well understood. Grice & strawson say that quine is pretending not to know what analyticity is . It"s all about where you feel the burden of proof lies. The question is, when is it legit to do something like what quine did: the closed curve . Quine has not made his case beyond reasonable doubt. If you"re going to have a push the burden of proof back the other way, you say i"m innocent so prove me wrong if you think i"m wrong".
