PHL232H1 Lecture Notes - Lecture 2: Spacetime, Sentience, Personal Identity
Document Summary
A at t1 is the same person as b at t2 just in case a at t1 has the same soul as b at t2 (1) requires the existence of souls. souls are not physical things. A at t1 is the same person as b at t2 just in case there is a continuous spatiotemporal path of persons connecting a at t1 and b at t2. We want to know what it is for someone to be one and the same person over time. Indeed, it isn"t enough that it as a matter of fact admits no exceptions. There just could not possibly be ant divergence between being the same person as, and being connected by a continuous spatiotemporal path. First consider how things seems from the inside. Imagine the prince had committed a horrible crime, prior to the switch. If this is right, then spatiotemporal continuity is not right. Spatiotemporal continuity is not sufficient for personal identity.
