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Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma (Robert Jervis).docx

4 Pages

Political Science
Course Code
POLI 244
Jason Scott Ferrell

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Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma (Robert Jervis) I. Anarchy and the Security Dilemma • Because no one can make or enforce international laws, the policies of cooperation that will bring mutual rewards if others cooperate may bring disaster if they do not • actors have four choices (priority list) STAG HUNT EXAMPLE 1. cooperation and disarmament (cooperate and trap the stag) 2. maintain a high level of arms while others are disarmed (chase a rabbit while other remain at their posts) 3. arms competition and high risk of war (all chase rabbits) 4. being disarmed while others are armed (stay at the original position while another chases a rabbit) • only takes one person unwilling to participate for the whole thing to derail 1. Although actors may know that they seek a common goal, they may not be able to reach it • international difficulties 1. incentives to defect + potent fear that even if the other state likes status quo, they may change their mind later 2. because there is no international authority to guarantee access to resources during wartime, even a state that prefers status quo may try to increase its area of control (think Japan's pre-WWII drive into China and Southeast Asia) -->Ideological buffer zone to prevent attack 3. security dilemma: many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others (British Navy constituted an important instrument of coercion in war) II. What Makes Cooperation More Likely? • PRISONER'S DILEMMA EXAMPLE ◦ Different from Stag Hunt because there is no solution that is in the best interests of all the participants ▪ offensive and defensive incentives to defect from coalition ◦ if game only played once, only rational response is to defect ◦ if game is repeated indefinitely, latter characteristic no longer holds, and can analyze the game in terms of the stag hunt ▪ in the interest of each actor to have others deprived of the power to defect (sacrifice this ability if others will too) • The costs of being exploited (CD--cooperate-defect) ◦ drives security dilemma ◦ easier it is to destroy a state, the greater the reason for it either to join a larger secure unit, or else to be especially suspicious of others (large army, and quick attack) ▪ defect in stag hunt if he thinks they won't catch anything as a group ◦ more easy to trust others if you are powerful, because you can survive a loss (costs of CD are tolerable) ▪ they then adopt less arms, which is less likely to threaten others ▪ a world of small states will feel the effects of anarchy much more than a world of large ones ▪ BUT if one state gains invulnerability, problem remains because it can exploit the others ▪ i.e. In order to protect herself, Austria had either to threaten or to harm others after the Napoleonic Wars, whereas Britain did not. For Austria and her neighbours, the security dilemma was acute; for Britain it was not ◦ ultimate cost of CD is loss of sovereignty • Subjective Security Demands ◦ decision-makers act in terms of the vulnerability they feel ▪ differ about how much security they desire (price they are willing to pay to gain increments of security) ▪ perception of threats (the estimate of whether the other will cooperate) ▪ When a state believes that another not only is not likely to be an adversary, but has sufficient interests in common with it to be an ally, then it will actually welcome an increase in the other's power • Geography, Commitments, Beliefs, and Security through Expansion ◦ ease or difficulty with which all state can simultaneously achieve a high degree of security varies ◦ influence of military technology ◦ surrounded by powerful states makes you need to be ready, if they become your enemy (think Germany, surrounded by France and Russia, felt forced to adopt Schlieffen Plan) III. Offense, Defense, and the Security Dilemma • two crucial variables in security dilemma ◦ whether defensive weapons and policies can be distinguished from offensive ones ◦ whether the defen
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